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Wages during War, Inflation, and Dictatorship
THE present chapter is concerned with wage behavior in World War I,
the Great Inflation, and the period of National Socialism including
World War II. During these extraordinary episodes of German history,
the course of wages was so much affected by drastic changes in political
and economic circumstances and in governmental control measures that
it can be understood only in terms of these unique determinants.
The Great Inflation may be regarded as an aftermath of World War I.
And World War II follows the political, economic, and military pre-
parations carried out in the preceding phase of National Socialism.
Thus the contiguous episodes are related. It appears advisable to treat
the periods 1913-18 and 1919-23 separately, and to consider 1933-45
as a unit. The periods 1913-18 and 1919-23 present sharp contrasts;
the war years of the Kaiserreich differed widely from the postwar years
of the Weimar Republic, when the prevalent sentiments were pacifist
and anti-imperialist. The war period and the post-war years, moreover,
form two distinct business cycles, reflecting the initial success and final
collapse of the war adventure (19 14-17-19) and the inflationary boom and
bust of the reconstruction period (1919-22-23). Also in the labor market
there were decisive changes, in employment conditions, composition of
work force, degree of organization, and the like. Finally, there are marked
differences in the quality and quantity of statistics available for the war
years and for the postwar period.
For the entire period of the National Socialist regime, on the other hand,
the unifying elements outweigh the differences. Both prewar and war
years are characterized by the increasing importance of armament efforts,
and by political and ideological continuity. The high level of military
expenditures supported high levels of business activity and welded the
two periods into one huge cycle, for which we have fairly continuous and
consistent data on labor market conditions and on wages.
Wages in World War I
GENERAL'
The Labor Market. The War of 19 14-18 confronted the economy of an
industrially matured Germany with the first of a series of extraordinary
experiences. For the labor market, the initial effect of the declaration of
1Forthis section on wages during World War1,extensive use is made of the following
sources: Watdemar Zimmermann, "Die Veränderungen der Einkommens- und Lebens-
verhältnisse der deutchen Arbeiter durch den Krieg," in DieEinwirkung desKrieges
aufBevolkerungsbewegung, Einkommen und Lebenshaltung in Deutschland, Wirtschafts-
und Sozialgeschichte des Weltkrieges (Carnegie Foundation for International Peace,
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war and of mobilization was a drastic increase in unemployment. Appendix
Table A-35 shows that the unemployment ratio for trade union members
jumped from about 3 percent in the immediate prewar months to 22
percent in August 1914. This sharp rise is based on union statistics, refers
largely to skilled workers, and may not be altogether representative of
industry at large. But even with an admitted bias of the data, there can be
no question of the disorganizing effects of mass mobilization on industrial
enterprises, of the dismissal of workers in nonessential sectors of the
economy, and of temporary materials shortages—all of which contributed
to the increase in unemployment at the beginning of the war. By the
summer of 1915, employment was back to prewar levels. At this time the
principal war industries were already feeling the pinch of labor scarcity.
In the course of the following year shortages of workers became fairly
general, and unemployment ratios declined somewhat further.2 The great
expansion of industrial efforts began after the battle of the Somme in
1916. By the end of August of that year Generals Hindenburg and
Ludendorff had taken over the high command, established a special
ministry of war production, and launched the all-out effort known as the
Hindenburg program. The unemployment ratio of union members went
down still further, remaining below 1 percent from June 1917 to the end
of the war.
There are thus to be distinguished four major phases in labor-market
developments during World War I: first, the mobilization crisis; second,
the formation of a civilian labor force under wartime conditions; third,
the Hindenburg program; and fourth, the defeat. The, timing of these
periods corresponds fairly well with the cyclical fluctuations of general
business activity during the war, as measured by the National Bureau.
In its reference chronology the initial mobilization period up to the last
quarter of 1914 appears as a continuation of the contraction that began
in May 1913; the period of a gradually developing war economy and the
subsequent all-out effort under the Hindenburg program appear as
expansion; the final period of labor and raw material shortages appears
again as a contraction.3
In the course of the war, the total industrial work force was reduced.
Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1932). Peter Quante, "Lohnpolitik und Lohnent-
wicklung im Kriege," Zeizschrift des preussischen szatistischen Landesamis,1919,Vol.
59, pp. 323 if. Friedrich Hesse, "Die deutsche Wirtschaftslage von 1914 bis 1923.
Krieg, Geldblähe und Wechsellagen," Beitrage zur Erforschung der wirtschaftlichen
Wechse//agen: Aufschwung, Krise. Stockung,No.16 (Jena, 1938).
2Unionmembership dropped rapidly during the early years of the war; hence the
representativeness of the sample of unionized workers has been seriously questioned.
See W. Woytinsky, Der Deutsche Arbeitsmarkt (Berlin, Verlagsgesellschaft des Alige-
meinen deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes, 1930), pp. 11 and 32. The figures from 1915
on are held to overstate the degree of unemployment; nevertheless, they reflect the
gradual tightening of the labor market, even if they fail to picture adequately the extent
of the developing labor shortages.
'ArthurF. Burns and Wesley C. Mitchell, Measuring Business Cycles (National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1946), p. 79.WAR, INFLATION, AND DICTATORSHIP 193
Inestablishments subject to factory and mining inspection (those with ten
or more workers), 7.4 million were employed in 1913, and about 6.7
million4 in 1918. As important as the change in over-all levels were
changes in the composition of the work force. It can be seen from the
following tabulation that the ratio of female workers in the inspected
establishments rose from about one-fifth to about one-third. Women
made up for about half of the net loss suffered through mobilization of
men. The increasing employment of women, at least in the industrial
plants covered by inspection, resulted mainly from absorption of female
unemployed, transfer of women from nonindustrial to industrial jobs
(particularly in war plants), and shifts from smaller to larger enterprises.5
Our tabulation shows also a rise in the proportion of young workers.
However, since that classification covers only workers under 16 years of
age, the reported figures can merely indicate the existence, but not the
extent, ofsubstitution of youths for workers of draft age. Postponed
retirement, re-employment of superannuated workers, and employment
of civilian foreigners and prisoners of war also affected the composition
of the labor force.
Employment in Establishments Subject to Factory













under 16 571 602
Total 7,387 6,617
SOURCE: Zimmermann, op. cit., pp. 350-51.
The industrial composition of the work force also underwent major
changes during the war years. If the major industries are classified roughly
into war industries proper (metals, machinery, chemicals, petroleum, and
oil), predominantly civilian industries (food, clothing, textiles, printing),
W. Zimmermann, op. cit., pp. 350-51. For 1918, the industry detail given in this
source adds up to 6.8 million, and the printed total is 6.6.
See Clarence D. Long, TheLaborForce in Wartime America, Occasional Paper 14,
(National Bureau of Economic Research, 1944),pp. 48-49.194 WAGES IN GERMANY
and an intermediate group (wood, paper, leather,6 stone and clay, building,
mining, miscellaneous), the expansion of the war industries, the moderate
decline of the intermediate group, and the strong contraction
civilian industries appear clearly from the following tabulation:
of the
Employment in Establishments Subject
Broad Industrial Groups,







The wartime shifts in the composition of the work force can be followed
on the basis of semiannual inquiries by the StatistiseheReichsamt on
man-days worked. Thus we learn from Table 46 that, in the 370 establish-
TABLE46
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ments covered, total days worked dropped about a quarter in the months
following the mobilization order, then slowly returned toward prewar
levels, and began to exceed those levels after the launching of the Hinden-
burg program. Bythe end' of the war, these establishments employed
6 Leatheris included in the intermediate group because it was not available for






SOURCE: Zimmermann, bc. cit.
3,050
1,380
SOURCE: Investigation by the Statistische Reichsamt, Reichsarbeitsblatt, 1919, p. 619._ w - - w
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about as many men as before the war, but more than twice as many
women.
These drastic changes in the supply and demand for labor of various
sorts created an enormous turnover, placed the traditional wage structure
under eAtreme pressure, led to serious wage inequalities, and gave rise to
inflationary dangers. For the first time in modern German history the
government was challenged to tamper with the hitherto autonomous
labor market.
Wage Policies. The government did intervene, at first hesitantly, then
moving more firmly in response to acute pressures, but without the guid-
ance of a preconceived general policy. The haphazard character of wage
regulation and other measures affecting the labor market was accentuated
by the great number of governmental agencies authorized to intervene,
or in fact able to do so. Let us follow the major steps taken by the
authorities during various stages of the conflict.
In the earliest phase of the war the principle of contractual freedom was
fully maintained. Prices as well as wages were left to "find their own
levels" in response to market conditions. The general expectation was that
the war would be brief and victorious, so the only acute need seemed
to be maintenance of peace in the domestic labor market. Since all major
unions had entered Burgfrieden (labor truce) arrangements and voluntarily
relinquished the strike weapon, the war ministry decided to assist in wage
negotiations and in the mediation of disputes. Its assistance was supposed
to be technical in nature; the government was not to be concerned with
the adequacy of particular wage levels. It was not long, however, before
conditions developed which led the government to commit itself somewhat
further. When employment fell, during the initial mobilization, some
employers reduced wage rates. The unions protested but were powerless.
The war ministry, fearing a general lowering of labor morale, tried to
discourage such wage cutting. It announced that no military contracts
would be awarded to firms paying less than union wages and, at a later
phase (December 1915), it introduced into its contracts penalty clauses
for wage payments below levels collectively agreed upon. The impact of the
government's contract rules was, however, limited to a few industries,
such as clothing, wood, building, and tobacco, since in the typical war
industries collective agreements were extremely rare. The solution of the
problem of maintaining union standards was brought about by circum-
stances quite apart from governmental efforts—the developing scarcity of
workers.
As early as 1915 the ministry of war began to receive complaints from
war plants on pirating of workers. The ministry recommended that
employed workers should not be approached directly with offers of new
jobs, that advertisements of openings should not contain promises of
wage increases, and—at a later date—that Abkehrscheine (permissions to
change jobs) should not be granted if the current employer paid rates at--w- — -
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collectivelyagreed-upon levels. Such recommendations could do little
to stem the wage trends produced by the developing labor shortages.
During the first two years of the war the pressures toward wage increases
had been dampened by the early unemployment and by the availability
of labor reserves—women, youths, and retired workers. But when
casualties and military recruitment began to exhaust the labor reserve7
and the Hindenburg program decreed all-out production efforts, the
scarcity, especially in the armament industries, became acute. The result
was extreme pressure in the direction of rising wage levels.
The government supplemented the Hindenburg production program
by the Vaterländische Hilfsdienstgesetz (national labor service law), which
was designed to recruit additional manpower and to bring about a more
equal sharing of the burdens of war. All able-bodied men were now
obliged to participate in the economic war effort if called upon.8 The
law furthermore restricted labor mobility to some extent and provided
for strict screening of applications for Abkehrscheine—but very few of its
provisions had to do with wages. In theory the Hilfsdienstgesetz was
supposed to accomplish total economic mobilization. In practice, however,
the number of persons called up under the law was relatively small, so
that mobilization of manpower fell considerably short of the original
goal. This must be largely attributed to the fact that in 1917 most able-
bodied men were either in the armed forces or were gainfully employed.
Nor did the new law effectively cut down labor turnover; eventually a
formulation was adopted which permitted the granting of Abkehrscheine
in cases where the job change promised "sufficient improvement of work-
ing conditions." Since war industries, with their cost-plus contracts, were
easily in a position to offer "sufficient improvement," labor pirating went
on unabated, contributing to the rise of wage levels.9 The war ministry
continued, in principle at least, to keep aloof from determining actual
wage levels. As late as July 5, 1917 it ruled: "A definite position regarding
actual wage levels must be avoided under all circumstances, and suggestions
regarding wage increases are not in order."° In practice, there were
many instances of intervention. The armament industrialists, "through
channels," affected the decisions of mediation commissions which consisted
of labor, management, and government representatives. And in a number
of cases upward adjustments of wages were ordered to forestall unrest
The government tried to augment the native labor supply by compulsory recruiting
of foreigners (starting as early as 1915 with Belgian workers), employing prisoners of
war, and granting temporary leaves to soldiers. These measures mitigated somewhat
the shortages of labor, but could not abate the pressures.
8Womenwere not affected. The trade unions had agreed to the law only under the
condition that it was restricted to men between 17 and 60 years of age.
The inability of the war ministry to take strong measures in combating labor
turnover is well illustrated in a decree of September 14, 1917, which says in part:
"Industry must be relied upon, in its own interest, to resist labor turnover as much as
possible." Quante, op. cit., p. 332 (translation ours).
10Ibid.,p. 324 (translation ours)._ w
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inmines, shipyards, or other enterprises essential to the war program.
Clearly, the needs of the hour and the economic strength of the
interests involved conditioned the actions of the government. In general
the armament industries had their way, whether by appeal to the national
welfare or by exerting their influence in the war ministry itself. Civilian
industries had less recourse to governmental intervention either in their
own interests or in the interests of their workers. What movements in
wages actually developed under those conditions will be discussed in the
following sections.
MONEY WAGE LEVELS
During World War I money wages roughly doubled. It was a period of
increasing working hours, rising incidence of overtime payments, rapid
shifts of workers toward war industries, and basic changes in the sex,
age, and skill composition of the work force within each industry. To
what extent are these changes reflected in wage measures? There are no
comprehensive surveys of wage changes over time; in an attempt to answer
this question we shall have to content ourselves with the best available
sample studies. In general, wage rates increased less, of course, than
earnings, and hourly earnings less than weekly, for comparable groups
of workers. Furthermore, measures reflecting the shifts toward war
industries tend to indicate larger increases than those that exclude the
effects of these shifts by using fixed industry weights.
An unweighted average of weekly straight-time earnings of male workers
in seventeen occupations in Hanover increased by about 75percent
between June 1914 and June 1918.11 The data are an approximation to
weekly rates; changes in hours and premium payments are not included.
The wage increase registered by this sample is particularly low, for several
reasons. First, the data refer to straight-time earnings. Second, the terminal
date of the comparison is June, whereas the war continued until November.
Third, the sampled factories were located in relatively small cities, which
were less affected by the armament boom. Finally, and most important,
only one of the five industries covered is a typical war industry. How
different the situation was in the war industries is apparent from the data,
presented on Table 47, which cover hourly wage rates in metals and
machinery as well as in chemical plants in the district of Magdeburg.
Here the unweighted average rates of skilled adult men increased to
almost two and one-half times their prewar levels, although this rise is
measured only to July 1918 and not to the end of the war.
For gross hourly earnings we can utilize the results of some fairly
"Ida Meyer, "Die Löhne in Hannover, während des Krieges und nach dem Kriege,"
Vierteijahrshefre Deutscher Siädte(Berlin,1921), Vol.1, No. 3-4. See also Wirt-
schaftsstatistisches Taschenbuch, (Jena, 1922), p. 199. Data cover building, woodwork-
ing, printing, metals and machinery, and municipal services. For each of the five
industries, two factories with more than 10 workers, in each of several cities in the
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TABLE48
Average Hourly Earnings, 479 Establishments in Bavaria, by Industry, Skill,
Age, and Sex; Change from June 1914 to October 1918
OCTOBER 1918
Industry Skilled Men UnskiIle
IN PERCENT OFJUNE1914
d Men Women Youths
Metals 227 219 150 233
Machinery 233 228 213 276
Instruments 263 218 233 229
Chemicals 214 215 238 222
4 War industries 234 220 208 240
Mining 205 218 147 218
Stone and clay 207 214 233 241
Wood 210 226 220 239
Leather 227 207 222 236
Paper 179 189 218 193
Building 191 210 254 250
6 Intermediate industries 203 211 216 230
Food 189 197 200 211
Brewing 173 192 250 218
Textiles 176 190 185 188
Clothing 196 184 229 218
Shoes 208 219 227 225
Printing 174 185 200 176
Glass 207 234 240 204
Pottery 174 169 173 175
Gas and electric 171 186 188 191
Transportation 185 177 200 268
Trade 178 208 179 191
11 Civilian industries 185 195 206 206
Unweighted averages of 21
industry relatives 199 204 209 219
Relatives of averagea 204 220 205 235
aEarningsaverages equal total payroll divided by total manhours.
SOURCE: Karl Kreiner, "Die Arbeits-, Lohn-,undProduktionsverhältnisse derbayrischen
Industrie im Juni 1914,Oktober 1918 und Mai 1919,auf Orund der Wirtschaftserhebung
des Staatskommissars für Demobilmachung," des bayrischen Statistischen
Landesamts, 1921, p. 33. For earnings in pfennigs see Appendix Table A-36.
extensive investigations. Skilled male workers in 479 companies distri-
buted over twenty-one industries in Bavaria approximately doubled their
average hourly earnings between June 1914 and October 1918, although
more than half of the industries covered were essentially civilian in
character (see Table 48 and Appendix Table A-36). The greater incidence
of premium payments is reflected in this record of hourly earnings.
Similar results emerge from a government investigation into averageTABLE 49
Average Daily Earnings, 370 Establishments, by Sex and Industry,








Metals 100 102 114 125 135 145 178 213 217 234
Machinery 100 98 120 132 139 149 173 202 243 245
Chemicals 100 96 104 118 125 134 157 194 203 232
Electrical 100 89 110 117 127 165 205 242 267 298
4 War Industries 100.0 96.2 112.0123.0131.5148.2178.2212.8232.5252.2
Stone and clay 100 85 88 100 106 116 132 151 166 188
Wood 100 102 108 109 123 133 147 185 184 236
Leather and rubber100 98 97 114 115 126 144 154 162 173
Paper 100 106 114 124 129 141 160 188 210 240
4 Materials 100.0 97.8 101.8111.8118.2129.0145.8169.5180.5209.2
Food 100 102 104 105 103 108 114 132 137 150
Textiles 100 88 101 111 110 115 122 142 159 178
Clothing 100 72 94 98 106 97 130 155 180 216






averages3 100.099 114 127 135 146 176209226 241
FEMALE WORKERS
Metal 100 81 108 147 169 200 228 277 287 324
Machinery 100 86 126 140 159 170 189 214 264 275
Chemicals 100 81 100 111 131 150 174 221 239 280
Electrical 100 76 109 124 142 175 191 225 239 267
4 War industries 100.0 81.0110.8130.5 150.2173.8195.5234.2257.2286.5
Stone and clay 100 89 97 112 117 131 154 172 186 232
Wood 100 89 116 98 111 130 159 191 219 274
Leatherandrubber100 84 88 98 108 113 134 147 148 171
Paper 100 104 107 118 123 133 170 190 213 250
4 Materials 100.0 91.5102.0106.5114.8126.8154.2175.0191.5231.8
Food 100 90 100 110 114 138 135 177 192 202
Textiles 100 89 97 101 105 101 112 144 170 187
Clothing 100 67 95 80 100 95 125 156 175 219
Printing 100 90 89 103 110 114 126 147 167 199
4Civilianindustries 100.0 84.0 95.2 98.5107.2112.0124.5156.0176.0201.8
Unweigh ted averagesof
industryrelatives100.0 85.5 102.7111.8124.1 137.5158.1188.4208.2240.0
Relativesof
averages6 100 85 99 112 132 154 178 214 239 264
aEarningsaverages equal total payroll divided by total man-days.
SOURCE:Investigation by the Statistische Reichsamt, Reichsarbeitsblatt,1917-1919, passim.For
earnings in marks see Appendix Table A-37.
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dailyearnings in 370 establishments covering several hundred thousand
workers in twelve industries.'2 The information is classified by industry
and sex. The unweighted average increase in daily earnings of male workers
in each of the twelve industries amounts to 114 percent between March
1914 and September 1918 (see Appendix Table A-37 and Table 49).
Reflected in this measure are longer hours per day, premium payments,
and shifts in the composition and occupational distribution of male
workers, but not interindustry shifts.'3 Appendix Tables A-38, A-39,
and A-40, which will be referred to later in another context, present further
examples of wage development in the printing, metals, transportation,
mining, and building industries.
It is difficult to arrive at an orderly summary of the many, often widely
varying, pieces of evidence. Hourly wage rates over the nation as a whole
seem to have increased by less than 100 percent in the course of the war.
For weekly earnings, both Quante and Zimmermann evaluated the over-all
situation about as follows: only a relatively small group of workers failed
to double their earnings during the war. For a majority of workers
earnings increased by 120 to 150 percent. Finally, a small group of
privileged workers enjoyed greater increases, sometimes amounting to
more than a tripling of their prewar earnings.
The increases in hourly earnings were, of course, more moderate than
in weekly earnings. Of the twenty-one industries in Bavaria for which
average data on hourly earnings are available, increases of less than 100
percent were reported as follows: for skilled men by eleven industries,
for unskilled men by nine, for women by five, and for youths by six.
These industry averages imply that the number of workers experiencing
less than a doubling of their hourly earnings must have been sizeable.
Whatever the increases of wages from 1913 to 1918, the patterns of all
wage trends were similar in some respects. During the initial mobilization,
wages declined, maintained their level, or increased but slightly.'4 In the
subsequent years, up to about mid-1916, increases were general. From
then to the end of the war wage rises accelerated, tending to exceed the net
increase of the first half of the war. (See Table 47 and Appendix Tables
A-37, A-38, A-39, and A-40.)
Basically, the pattern in the change of wage levels must be explained
12Datacompiled and published by the Statistische Reichsamt.
A simple division of total man-hours into total payroll, at the beginning and at
the end of the war, results in an increase of average daily earnings of 141 percent. The
difference between the two increases furnishes an indication of the importance of
shifts between industries.
14Upto 1916 union wage rates in civilian industries tended to be ceiling rates.
Management held the line tenaciously, even by denouncing malcontent workers as
troublemakers to the recruiting officers. The normal consequence was induction of the
accused workers into the military services, which the unions called Dro/iung mitdem
Schutzengraben(threateningwith the trenches). This practice ceased when procurement
rather than labor costs became the major problem. See Zimmermann, op.cit., pp.
360-61.202 WAGESIN GERMANY
in terms of the major phases of labor market and general economic
conditions. The early maintenance or reduction of wages is related to
the mobilization crisis. The subsequent wage increase to 1916 is to be
understood in terms of gradual acceleration of war production, depletion
of labor force reserves, and rising price levels. The marked increases
toward the end of the war must be viewed against the background of the
desperate efforts in both the military and economic spheres, the acute
shortages of manpower and goods, and the spiraling inflationary trends.
Up to this point wage behavior during World War I has been described
in fairly broad averages, covering many occupations, establishments, and
sometimes industries. We have found that even these data showed con-
siderable variety of response to wartime conditions—but of course they
do not fully express the extreme diversity of wage trends. Examples of the
diversity are numerous. In private and government-owned war plants
in large industrial centers, three- to fourfold increases of earnings were
reported for a number of occupations or departments; these contrast
with earnings increases amounting to only 70 or 80 percent, as in south-
eastern textile plants.15 Other differential trends developed as between
workers paid on a time basis and those working on piece rates. Piece rates
were rarely lowered during the war, with the result that unskilled or semi-
skilled men and women doing piece-rate work often obtained appreciably
higher earnings than their skilled co-workers who remained on time rates.
In terms of marks and pfennigs rather than wage trends, we find that by
the end of the war some highly specialized metal workers in the Berlin
industrial region earned 50 or even 60 marks per day—that is, about 10
times as much as the daily rates for common labor in Dresden nonwar
plants (6 marks), 17 times as much as the corresponding rate in Elbing
(3.50 marks), and 20 to 30 times as much as the daily rate for young
girls working in nonwar plants outside the big industrial centers. In
prewar times such differences were unheard of.
WAGE DIFFERENTIALS'6
SkIll DWerentials. Skill differentials tended to narrow during World
War J. The Statistische Reichsamt, in tracing the development of wages
and prices through the war period and the Great Inflation, presented
comparable series of wage rates for skilled and unskilled employees of
the German railways. These series show a narrowing of skill differentials
from 31 percent in 1913 to 6 percent in 1917 (see Appendix Table A-l4).
Similar findings emerge for rates of building workers in Berlin, Hamburg,
and Stettin (Appendix Table A-39) and for the average hourly earnings of
male workers in twenty-one Bavarian industries (first two columns of
15Ibid.,pp. 400if.The above observations all refer to earnings, not to wage rates.
Rate increases in the textile plants mentioned were sometimes as low as 50 percent.
16Asin previous chapters, the term differential describes the difference between wages
of higher paid and wages of lowerpaid workers in percent of the former.WAR, INFLATION, AND DICTATORSHIP 203
Table 50).17Thelatter data constitute good evidence for the claim that the
prevailing tendency was toward a narrowing of wage differentials between
skilled and other workers. Differentials, computed on the basis of weighted
averages for the whole sample, changed from 27 to 21 percent. Of the
twenty-one industries covered, fourteen showed a narrowing, one showed
no change, and six showed a widening in skill differentials.
Reasons for a narrowing of skill differentials in wartime come readily
to mind. Negotiations during the war reflected the greater need for
protection of low-paid workers in the face of monetary depreciation.
In this spirit, cost-of-living adjustments were given in absolute rather
than percentage terms. As for earnings, it appears that the entry into the
work force of quickly trained or elderly people diluted the quality of the
skilled groups in particular. Furthermore, mass-production methods used
in filling war orders, together with the incentive system as administered
during the war, served to boost the pay of the unskilled. As noted above,
earnings of unskilled men on piece work sometimes exceeded those of their
skilled neighbors.
There are, on the other hand, numerous examples of widening skill
differentials. Table 47 shows that wage rates of unskilled metal and
chemical workers in Magdeburg increased less than those of their skilled
fellow-workers. The same holds true for average shift earnings of workers
in the Krupp steel works at Essen (see Appendix Table A-38) and for
certain industries in Bavaria. In that state, average earnings for war
industries as a group indicate an increase in skill differentials due, no
doubt, to the extreme scarcity of such specialized personnel as tool- and
diemakers or workers able to handle the large tools used in making heavy
arms. We find then that, though unskilled workers on the whole tended
to imprpve their wage position in relation to the broad group of skilled
workers, they did not do so in relation to such skilled persons as precision
workers in metals and machinery.
Age DWerentials. One would surmise that the scarcity of adult workers
led to decreasing age differentials. This can indeed be observed in many
instances. From the report of the inquiry into average hourly earnings in
Bavaria, we find that age differentials narrow from 68 percent to 64
if comparison is made with earnings of skilled adults, and from 57 percent
to 54 if comparison is made with the earnings of unskilled and semiskilled
(see Table 50). These relatively modest changes gain in significance when
we note that in comparison with skilled adults, young workers maintained
or improved their relative position in all but one of the twenty-one
Thesedata were not available to Quante and seem to have been neglected by
Zimmermann. The average hourly earnings statistics for Bavaria are based on a special
inquiry of the State Commissioner for Demobilization. The data cover 479 firms with
about 170,000 employees, and report hourly earnings of skilled and unskilled men,
women, and youths separately for 21 industries and for the months of June 1914,
October 1918, and April 1919. The results of the inquiry, published in 1921, constitute
the most important body of information for an evaluation of changes in skill, sex,
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reporting industries. Other examples of narrowing margins between
wages of young and adult workers are to be found in records of shift
earnings in the Krupp steel works. Average shift earnings are available
separately for youths of 16 to 21 and youths under 16 years of age. Both
categories—whether measured against shift earnings of skilled or unskilled
adults—show a decided improvement in the relative position of young
workers (see Appendix Table A-38).
As with skill differentials, numerous exceptions to the general findings
must be noted. In metals and machinery, and in the chemical industry
in Magdeburg, for instance, age differentials widened in the course of the
war.18 Such situations were apt to occur in industries or establishments
where adults commanded premium wages and where young workers were
employed mainly as helpers.
Sex DWerentials. Wages of women tended to advance more than those
of men during the war period. For Bavaria, (see Table 50) in fifteen out
of twenty-one industries hourly earnings of women increased more than
those of skilled men, and in sixteen industries more than those of unskilled
and semiskilled men. And of the twelve industries surveyed by the
Statistische Reichsamt, only two showed widening sexdifferentials
(370 enterprises, gross differentials without standardization for skill;
see Table 51). According to Reichsamt data, the differential between
women's and men's earnings declined from 53 to 47 percent. From the
Bavarian data, the change appears to have been still smaller.
The Reichsamt data, which are semiannual, permit us to follow the
change in sex differentials during the main periods of the war. During
the first few months of the mobilization crisis, earnings for women in
almost all industries covered declined more than those of After the
autumn of 1914 the sex differential narrowed, reaching prewar proportions
in some industries as early as March 1915, in others as late as September
1917. From these levels, sex differentials were typically further reduced
although not without intermittent reversals; during the last year of the
war reductions in sex differentials are observable in most industries.
The net result of wage changes, from the beginning to the end of the war,
led to a narrowing of sex differentials.
The stages in the development of wage differentials between men and
women can be followed in terms of the major changes in labor-market
conditions, particularly in employment for women. During the early war
years female workers could be recruited relatively easily, while men
became increasingly scarce. This explains the initial widening of sex
differentials. With the intensification of military and industrial efforts,
the female labor reserve shrank and additional incentives were necessary
to recruit women and to attract them to war industries. In the later stages
of the war, industrial processes were adapted to female workers, and with
18Zimmermannassumes in fact that the earnings of youths more often than not
lagged behind those of adult workers, ibid., p. 363.206 WAGES IN GERMANY
TABLE 51
Sex Differentials, Based on Average Daily Earnings in 370 Establishments,
March and September 1914-1918
(differences between average earnings of men and those of women, expressed in






















Metal 63 71 65 56 54 49 53 52 51 49
Machinery 57 63 55 54 51 51 53 55 54 52
Chemicals 54 61 56 57 5249 49 48 46 45
Electrical 39 48 40 36 32 35 43 43 45 45
4 War industries 54 62 55 52 48 46 50 50 49 48
Stone and clay 64 63 61 60 61 60 58 59 60 56
Wood 53 59 49 58 58 54 49 51 44 45
Leather 44 52 50 52 48 50 48 47 49 45
Paper 4547 49 48 48 49 42 45 45 43
4 Materials 52 55 52 54 53 53 49 50 49 47
Food 63 67 65 61 59 53 56 50 48 50






















industries 53 56 56 57 54 53 54 48 46 47
Differentials
between industry
averagesa 53 58 54 54 51 50 51 50 48 47
Earnings averages equal total payroll divided by total man-days.
aBasedon unweighted combination of twelve industry averages.
SOURCE: Appendix Table A-37.
growing experience women were given more responsible and more highly
paid jobs. This process brought about the narrowing of sex differentials
to and beyond prewar levels.
There were, however, situations in which production proper was
carried out by men, while women did only subsidiary work, as in the
metals industry. There were also cases where, though the earnings of
women increased substantially beyond the average for women as a group,
men's earnings rose still faster, as in machinery and instrument making.
Perhaps more important than the extent of the change in sex differentials—
which depended on the specific employment conditions of men as well
as of women—was the fact that in the course of the war women learned
to fill jobs and command wages which up to that period had been reserved
for males.
Industrial Differentials. The most conspicuous changes in wage differ-
entials during World War I occurred along industrial lines. A growingWAR, INFLATION, AND DICTATORSHIP 207
inequalityamong industries appears in the following measures of variation
computed from averages of daily earnings in 370 establishments in
twelve industries :19Industrialinequality rose immediately in men's
Mar. 1914 Sept. 1914Sept. 1915Sept. 1916Sept. 1917Sept. 1918
Men 14.7 18.5 17.8 18.4 20.6 19.0
Women 10.5 11.9 16.0 21.0 19.1 16.2
earnings and more gradually in women's earnings. It reached its peak for
men in 1917, for women in 1916. At the end of the war industrial inequality
of average earnings was decidedly greater than it had been before the war.
Table 49 shows that the decisive differentiation occurred between war
and civilian industries. The following tabulation gives the percentage
increase of daily earnings between March 1914 and September 1918,
in each of three classes of industry:
Men Women
War industries + 152%+186%
Intermediate group+109%+132%
Civilian industries +81%+ 102%
Differentials between average daily earnings in the civilian and in the war
industry group, in percent of war industries, show the following move-
ments:
Mar. 1914 Sept. 1914Sept. 1915Sept. 1916Sept. 1917Sept. 1918
Men 4 11 17 28 36 32
Women 3 —1 26 37 35 31
Clearly, earnings differentials between war and civilian industries increased
during the war, reaching their peak in 1916 or 1917.
Up to this point, the discussion of industrial differentials has been based
on the Reichsamt data for 370 establishments (Table 49). Basically similar
conclusions follow also from examination of the Bavarian data on hourly
earnings in twenty-one industries. The requisite classification has been
provided in Table 48; it shows an average increase in earnings of skilled
men in war industries of 134 percent, in civilian industries of 85 percent.
Obviously the differences in earnings paid by war and civilian industries
resulted from varying demand for the products of these two industry
groups. In addition, there were factors that tended to augment the
differentiation. First, immediately before the outbreak of the war Germany
had undergone a recession, particularly in producers' goods industries;
unemployment in these industries had been considerable and earnings
19Asimplified coefficient of variation is used, consisting of the average deviation
(signs ignored) of the industry averages from their own mean, divided by that mean,
multiplied by 100.208 WAGES IN GERMANY
levels had fallen. Thus during the war the rise was especially marked for
this group. The second factor was produced by conditions prevailing
around the end of the war; during 1917 and 1918 raw material shortages
created unemployment, short work, and relatively low earnings levels in a
number of civilian industries. The effect was to dampen the percentage
increases of earnings shown by the civilian industry group.
Toward the close of the war the industrial differentials narrowed some-
what. Low-wage earners required more protection against the effects of
inflation. Cost-of-living bonuses, granted in absolute terms, served to
diminish the gap between high-wage and low-wage industries. Further-
more, the decline in labor force reserves and the reduction of civilian
output to a bare minimum brought conditions in the two industry groups
closer together. Both became equally essential and both experienced
similar difficulties in recruiting labor.
WAGES AND PRICES
How do wage-rate changes during the war compare with changes in
wholesale and retail prices? Only one wholesale price index is available
for the period of World War I. Presented in monthly form in Appendix
Table A-41 the index shows a 50 percent increase over prewar levels by
July 1915, a doubling by August 1917, and an increase of about 135
percent by the end of the war. These increases, at the stated points in
time, are greater than those of hourly wage rates. However, the slight
coverage and doubtful representativeness of the wholesale price index20
make it impossible to draw significant conclusions.
Although there is no "official" cost-of-living index for Germany before
February 1920, there are three sets of data on which an evaluation of
changes in living costs during the war can be based. The first is a series of
private estimates of food-cost or living-cost changes in certain cities.
Food costs are available for a few selected dates, living costs for 1914 and
for October 1918 only.2' The second set of data consists of monthly
estimates of the costs of sixteen foods which made up the basic ration of
a German Marine. The food prices were ascertained regularly in about
two hundred cities and were weighted according to the composition of the
Marine ration.22 Third, there are annual estimates of wartime living costs
20Theindex is unsatisfactory with regard to commodity groups included, number of
commodities priced per group, and regional coverage of the price sample. The index
covers thirty-eight commodities, eighteen foods and twenty raw materials.
21Estimatesfor Berlin, Saxony, Danzig, and the Rhine province may be found in
Quante, op. Cit., for food, p. 366, and for living costs, p. 368. Estimates for rationed food
prices in Prussia were made by Gunther up to February 1918 and continued by Zimmer-
mann; see Zimmermann, op. cit., p. 430.
22Thisindex was published monthly in Monalliche Ubersichten über Lebensrnittel-
preise by the private organization (Wirtschaftstatistisches Bureau, Berlin) of Richard
Caiwer and during the war served as the major guide for estimates of retail food costs.
Frequently the index was misleadingly referred to as a cost-of-living index. The monthly
data of Caiwer's index are reproduced in Appendix Table A-41.WAR, INFLATION, AND DICTATORSHIP 209
prepared by the Statistische Reichsamt during the mid-1920's.23 The
increases in living costs during the course of the war shown by the three
sets of data vary considerably: 229 percent (Calwer), 257percent(Quante),
and 313 percent (Statistisches Reichsamt).24
The annual Reichsamt estimates constitute the best available measure
of the rise in living costs during World War I. For comparison of living-
cost estimates with monthly wage data, it was necessary to reduce the
former series to a monthly basis. Accordingly, Caiwer's monthly index
of food costs, 1913 to January 1920, was adjusted to correspond with the
annual level of the Reichsamt estimates of total living costs and to connect
with the official cost-of-living index, which is available from February
1920 on. The estimate aimed at reflecting, as far as possible, the intra-
annual movements of the Calwer data while preserving the annual living-
cost levels. The basic data and the resulting monthly estimates of total
living costs are set forth in Appendix A-41. The most conspicuous
deviations between the Caiwer index of food costs and the monthly index
of total living costs derived in the present study are to be noted for 1917
and 1918. At the beginning of 1917 both Caiwer's index and the new
estimates are approximately twice as high as before the war, but for
October 1918 the former index stands at 213, the latter at 273. Both
the increase registered by the Calwer index and the greater rise shown by
the new monthly index are larger than the increase in wage levels for the
majority of all workers.
REAL WAGES
The observed relation between changes in wages and in living costs meant
a sharp decline of real wages. Changes in average real weekly wages in
four occupations as reported by the Statistische Reichsamt are shown in
Table 52. For the three series describing wages of skilled male workers,
the real wage decline between 1913 and 1918 ranges from 17 to 46 percent.
The net decline in the real wage rates of unskilled railway workers during
the same period is reported as only 0.2 percent, although the real wage
level in 1917 is given as about 26 percent below prewar levels. Increases
between 1917 and 1918 appear in all four series, but they are probably
fictitious. The economic circumstances of the last war year could scarcely
have permitted significant improvements in real wages.
The gradual deterioration of real earnings can be studied on the basis
of the Reichsamt's investigation of 370 enterprises. Using our monthly
23Theseestimates entered the real wage computations which the Reichsamt published
in connection with its attempt to describe the behavior of major economic activities
during the period of monetary depreciation, 19 13-23. See "Zahien zur Geldentwertung
in 1914 bis 23," Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1925., p. 40. The annual cost-of-
living index presented here (see Appendix Table A-41) was derived by dividing real
wages into money wages.
24TheCaiwer and Reichsamt rises refer to the full years 1913 and 1918. The Quante
estimate refers to the rise between 1914 and the month of October 1918.210 WAGESIN GERMANY
TABLE 52




























































a Miners'wages are earnings until November 1922, and rates from December 1922 on.
Data refer to Dortmund.
SOURCE: Wirrschaft und Statistik,1925,"Zahlen zur Geldentwertung in Deutschland,
1914 bis 1923," pp. 40-41.
estimates of living costs as deflators, we obtain the averages of the relatives
of real earnings, in Table 53. Broadly, these changes are: a 10 to 20 percent
decrease in 1914; a tendency toward stabilization up to the spring of 1916;
a decline to spring 1917, lowering real earnings to levels 25 to 35 percent
below prewar; and stabilization at these low levels thereafter.25 This
behavior conforms roughly to the changing economic situation. The
decline from March to September 1914 coincides with the mobilization
crisis, the drop after March 1916 and the subsequent stabilization at low
levels with the introduction and implementation of the Hindenburg
program.
In view of the differentiated wage trends as between men and women,
war and civilian industries, and other groupings, it is necessary to follow
the varying courses of real earnings (see Table 53).Themost outstanding
deviation from the all-industry trendfound for real earnings of women
in war industries. These increased between September 1914 and March
1916, at a time when real wages in all other groups decreased. Moreover,
by the end of the war this group showed the highest real earnings in
relation to prewar levels (88 percent). At the other extreme are real
earnings of men in civilian industries, which were as low as 55percentof
prewar levels. For a more complete picture of the course of real wages
during the war, one should consider their development industry by industry.
The relative standing of daily real earnings in each of twelve industries
Otherquarterly and semiannual data, such as shift earnings of workers employed
by Krupp (Essen), for instance, show very similar patterns.WAR, INFLATION, AND DICTATORSHIP 211
TABLE53
Average Daily Real Earnings, 370 Establishments, March and September
1914-1918
(March 1914 =100)
1914 1915 1916 1917 1918
Mar.Sept.Mar.Sept.Mar.Sept.Mar.Sept.Mar.Sept.
MALE WORKERS
War industries10090.8 91.889.8 88.978.4 76.278.8 77.877.4
Intermediate
industries 10092.3 83.481.6 79.968.3 62.362.8 60.464.2
Civilian




tives 10088.9 85.983.0 80.868.2 64.364.8 63.465.7
Relatives of
averagess 10093.4 93.492.7 91.277.2 75.277.4 75.673.9
FEMALE WORKERS
War industries10076.4 90.895.3101.592.0 83.586.7 86.087.9
Intermediate
industries 100 86.3 83.677.7 77.667.1 65.964.8 64.071.1
Civilian




latives 10080.6 84.181.6 83.872.8 67.569.8 69.673.6
Relatives of
averagesa 10080.2 81.181.8 89.281.5 76.179.3 79.981.0
aEarningsaverages equal total payroll divided by total man-days.
SOURCE: Table 49 and Appendix Table A-41.
at the close of the war, as compared with prewar levels, is given in Table
54.Thehighest relative standing of real earnings was registered by women
in the metal industries; in September 1918 their earnings were approxi-
mately equal to prewar levels. The lowest relative standing is found for
male workers in the food industry, whose real earnings in September
1918 came to only 46 percent of those prevailing in March 1914. The
majority of the reported industry groups show materially reduced real
earnings levels in 1918 as compared with 1914.
Quante, and later summarize real wage developments
during the war. They state that for all workers real earnings declined to212 WAGESIN GERMANY
TABLE54


















































industry relatives 65.7 73.6
Relatives of averagea 73.9 81.0
Earnings averages equal total payroll divided by total man days.
souRcE: Appendix Tables A-37 and A-41.
mid-1917; for most workers the decline continued throughout the remain-
ing war years; for a small proportion the war boom brought a recovery to
prewar levels; for a very few it brought advantages over the prewar situa-
tion. The summary evaluation in this nonquantitative form remains
substantially valid even if alternative living cost estimates are used.
Reduced food, clothing, and other rations, and decreasing per capita
consumption of consumers' goods confirm the basic finding that planes of
living deteriorated radically. During the last year of World War I con-
sumers' durables were extremely scarce and of low quality. Homes were
ransacked for pieces of copper or brass, stove doors, kitchen utensils,
or other hardware that could be used for armaments. Coal was rationed
rigidly, in quantities insufficient for human comfort. Clothing was scarce,
rationed, and of very inferior quality. Meat, toward the end of the war,
was rationed at 250 grams per week per person in large cities, and 100 to
150 grams in small towns. Butter and eggs, if available at all, could be
had only in very small quantities. The lack of fats and proteins began toWAR, INFLATION, AND DiCTATORSHIP 213
underminethe population's health. Even potatoes and flour were scarce.
Turnips became a mainstay of the diet. The inadequacy of the war diet
is illustrated in the following tabulation, in which food rations valid during
two selected periods are shown as percentages of prewar consumption:











Vegetable fats 39 17
Cereals 52 48
souRcE: Zimmermann, op. cit., p. 457.
Goods in excess of rations could sometimes be acquired by barter, by
payment of exorbitant prices, or through personal relations. Many
families received food packages sent by soldier husbands or sons from
Belgium. Others got food from friends or relatives in the country. The
well to do could buy in the "black, market." To live on the official rations
meant serious malnutrition and physical deterioration.
The war, moreover, created enormous disparities among the wage
incomes of differently situated families. At one extreme were large-city
families of highly skilled deferred workers with grown-up children. Such
families could consist entirely of wage earners in well-paying industries.
At the other extreme were families of soldiers and sailors with young
children, whose mothers were at best available for part-time work. The
government attempted to dampen the flagrant inequalities in family
earnings by adjusting basic wage rates in accordance with marital status
and number of dependent children.26 But the supplementary payments
had slight effect upon the strong basic disparities.
While some privileged groups could avoid impoverishment and actual
malnutrition, a large part of the working population could not. Their
situation is vividly described in a petition submitted in August 1918 to
the Ministry of the Interior by the roofers' union. The petition, said to
"echo over 100 letters," states in part: "It cannot go on this way. Our
colleagues are being physically ruined.... They don't get enough money
to pay black-market prices, and rationed goods don't fill their stomachs.
They have nothing to wear. Each week it gets. worse. Several articles have
risen in price twentyfold while wage rates have gone up by only one-half.
We can't keep up with it, we are finished.... Our closets and cupboards
26Thefamily bonuses and bonuses for children constituted elements of the Soziallohn
(social wage) principle which remained part of the German wage system after the war.214 WAGESIN GERMANY
are bare, our savings are in the safes of the usurers. Our children starve
It is simply beyond our strength."27
Wages in the Great Inflation
This section deals with the behavior of wages during the postwar period
from the Armistice of November 1918 to the stabilization of the currency
at the end of 1923. Previous chapters have dealt with wage behavior during
the inflation as part of the description of long-term tendencies. Here we
shall relate it in detail to the economic conditions of the time and observe
the strange problems that arose in the race between wages and prices.28
MONEY WAGE LEVELS
Changes in wage levels during the inflation can be depicted by compre-
hensive indexes of hourly and weekly wage rates for skilled and unskilled
workers in eight industries, as shown in Appendix Table A-42.29 Taking
prewar levels as the basis of comparison,30 one might say that wage rates
in marks were roughly 3 times their 1913 levels by the end of 1918; 5
timesby the end. of 1919; 10 times by the end of 1920; 20 times by the
end of 1921. From that point on one must proceed at shorter intervals
to convey the course of wage increases as measured in currency. By the
middle of 1922 wage rates in marks were 50 times as high as before the
war, and by the end of that year, 500 times. By the middle of 1923, they
stood at ten thousand times their prewar levels and by the end of that year
at a trillion times the levels of 1913.
Wage developments during the Great Inflation showed a relatively high
degree of homogeneity, as can be seen in Appendix Tables A-43 and A-44,
which present some of the major series of weekly money wages, available
by months. That all wage rates rose phenomenally is not surprising, since
the decisive determinant was the currency depreciation. If we compare
27Quotedin Schriften der Gesellschaft für Soziale Reform, Vol. 65 (Jena, 1919),
p. 6 (translation ours).
28Wagebehavior during the inflation is described by Constantino Bresciani-Turroni
in "The Movement of Wages in Germany during the Depreciation of the Mark and after
Stabilization," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 1929, PP. 374-427. The same
author discussed wages during 1919-23 in The Economics of Inflation (London, 1937),
pp. 300-3 13 and 224-427. See also Robert Kuczynski's "Postwar Labor Conditions in
Germany," U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin No. 380, 1925.
29Theweekly data were compiled by the Statistische Reichsamt for selected months
of 1922 and for all months of 1923. The International Labour Office estimated the
movement of hourly wage levels by making the necessary adjustments for changes in
working hours. In order to obtain, in the present study, a tolerably comprehensive
index for the whole period 1919-23, the eight-industry index was interpolated and
extrapolated on the basis of other available infot'mation. The procedures used are
described in the note to Appendix Table A-42.
30Hereas well as in other parts of this section, wage levels during the inflation are
compared with prewar levels. This is preferable since a later base, located, for instance,
at the time of the Armistice, would be statistically less certain and economically less
significant.WAR, INFLATION, AND DICTATORSHIP 215
trendsin the dollar exchange rate, in domestic prices, and in wages
(Appendix Tables A-41 and A-42, and Chart 28), we find that, although
these measures do not exhibit identical inflationary increases, their major
movements are in close correspondence—the strong rise of the series up
to the spring or summer of 1920, the tendency toward flattening out or
even decline until mid-1921, the accelerated increases during the sub-
sequent year, and the hyperinflationary upsurge starting with the summer
of 1922.
The inflationary advance of wages after World War I continued certain
developments which had their origin in the war itself, and in its economic
consequences. The extreme scarcity of goods and labor in the face of high
money incomes and extensive government spending had, by the end of the
war, driven prices and wages up to about two and one-half times their
prewar levels. Germany's defeat, and the demobilization which swelled
the ranks of the unemployed, relieved pressures on the labor market
but did not alleviate the scarcity of coal, iron, machinery, and consumers'
goods. Prices and wages continued to advance. From the Armistice to
the end of 1919 wages about doubled and prices rose by 240 percent.
The relation between currency depreciation, money wage levels, and
employment from the beginning of 1920 to about mid-1922 can be observed
in Chart 28. Note the inverse short-term correspondence between the
price and unemployment series.31 The explanation must be found in the
stimulus which price rises and currency depreciation gave to production
and trade. Buying equipment and materials at low prices and selling
finished products at high prices created substantial paper profits. Rising
prices served also to encourage speculative buying and padding of in-
ventories. Unfavorable exchange rates32 were a boon toall export
industries, although they acted as a brake on imports. With all these
forces in action the sudden jump of the dollar exchange rate from 15 to
24 marks at the beginning of 1920 led to a noticeable decrease of unemploy-
ment, and the subsequent fall of the dollar to 9 marks in June 1920 led to
an immediate increase in unemployment—particularly in the export
industries. With the further depreciation of the currency, up to about
mid-1922,33 unemployment went down again.
Until about that date the currency depreciation was accompanied by
increases in production and employment. How did wages fare during
this period? Money wage rates moved upward under the joint pressure of
a depreciating currency and a tightening labor market, but they did not
reflect the minor fluctuations in either. They went up by relatively small
steps during 1919 and 1920, despite the hectic changes in the external and
internal value of the currency. The leveling-off during the latter part of
"Heremeasured by the unemployment rate of union members.
32By"unfavorable" exchange rate is meant the relatively low external value of the
German currency.
The reference peak was in May 1922.216 WAGES IN GERMANY
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1920 and the first half of 1921 reflected the temporary success of the
German government's stabilization efforts and took place in the face of
increasing employment. During the last months of 1921 and the first
half of 1922, the changes in the value of the currency and the tightening
of the labor market exerted. pressure in the same direction and led to a
quadrupling of wages in less than ten months.
In mid-1922 the dams burst. The currency began to depreciate at an
ever faster rate, inaugurating the hyperinflation. After an abortive attempt
at stabilization in the spring of 1923, the period of astronomic rises set in.
Hyperinflation, in the second half of 1922 and the year 1923, was accom-
panied by very different changes in production and employment than had
occurred in the preceding milder phase of currency depreciation. Reference
to Appendix Table A-35 shows that unemployment climbed fast, reaching
6 percent of union members in mid-1923 and 19 percent by October of
that year. The rapid and unpredictable changes in the value of money led
to a Flucht in die Sachwerte, a grasping for any article that was not
affected by the depreciation. To keep one's assets protected was more
important than paper profits and losses. Rational business calculations
became increasingly difficult. Wages moved in the wake of the general
currency depreciation. As previously noted, by December 1923 wages
expressed in nonstabilized currency were close to one trillion times their
pre-1913 levels.
Changes in wage levels during the inflation have been described without
distinction between hourly and weekly wages or between wage rates and
earnings. For the period 1919-23 proper, there is some justification for
such neglect. During the inflation, the eight-hour day and the forty-eight-
hour week prevailed as "normal" work periods, and they were rarely
exceeded in practice. Hence hourly and weekly wage rates ordinarily
moved together, and earnings in general reflected very little overtime or
other premium payments. It is true that, particularly during the last
eighteen months of hyperinflation, part-time work and shared jobs
became increasingly frequent and affected average weekly earnings of
many groups of worke.rs. The available, information does not, however,
permit us to evaluate the course of average weekly earnings with any
degree of certainty. The distinction between hourly and weekly wage rates
becomes of great importance, however, if wage levels during the inflation
are compared with those prevailing before the outbreak of World War I,
because of the significant decreases in the length of the normal workweek.
The consequent difference in the relative level of hourly and weekly rates
is apparent in all the data contained in Appendix Table A-42. While
weekly wage rates tended on the average to increase somewhat less than a
trillion times between 1913 and the end of 1923, the increase of hourly
wages exceeded the trillion mark. The actual increase varied among different
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WAGEDIFFERENTIALS
The narrowing of skill and sex differentials during the inflation has been
described briefly in Chapter 3. It remains now to demonstrate in some
detail the extent of these and other changes in the wage structure.
From the data given in Tables 18, 55,andAppendix Table A-39, it is
apparent that a narrowing of skill differentials occurred in all industries
and under all types of local conditions. What we must note is the virtual
disappearance of the differentials during certain months. At times the
skill gap was close to 5 percent in whole industries such as building,
chemicals, and railroad transportation; and under special circumstances
the gap was virtually closed. Thus, for the cities of Berlin, Hamburg, and
Stettin, the hourly rates of unskilled building workers are reported to
have differed by 3 percent or even less from those of their skilled colleagues
by the end of 1920. Toward the close of 1923 skill differentials widened
somewhat. After the stabilization of the currency the differentials between
wages of skilled and unskilled grew in all industries, though they never
again reached the magnitudes typical of the prewar period.
For any systematic comparison of sex differentials with prewar levels
we must rely on textile data. Table 20 permits us to observe the change of
sex differentials from 1913 to April 1922; and from there on to December
1923. For both skilled and unskilled workers the differentials narrowed
over the period as a whole; the smallest differential of rates occurred
before the apogee of the inflation. Whereas before the war women employed
in textiles were paid about two-thirds of men's rates, during some periods
of the inflation they received as much as three-quarters of men's pay for
the same work, and occasionally a little more. After the stabilization this
group of women obtained roughly 70 percent of men's rates.34
As for industrial differentials, there is, unfortunately, little systematic
information for the period of inflation. What data there are apply only
to eight industries in 1913 and to selected dates from April 1922 on.
Despite the basic uniformity in the behavior of wages during the inflation,
dispersion measures show a greater variation of the industry averages
around their grand mean during the height of the inflation than either
before the war or after stabilization. For male workers, at selected dates,
we have the following figures:
Average Percentage Deviation from Unweighted Meana,
Eight Industries
1913July 1922 July 1923January 1924
Skilled 8.2 7.0 11.2 8.7
Unskilled 7.6 8.1 10.9 9.5
Asimplified coefficient of variation is used, consisting of the average deviation
(signs ignored) of theindustry averages from their own mean, divided by the mean,
multiplied by 100.
Obviously one cannot draw broad conclusions frcm figures for the textile industry
alone. The investigation of war wages in 370 establishments showed that daily earnings
of female textile workers, relative to those of male workers, were higher, throughout
the war, than in most of the other industries (See Table 51).220 WAGES IN GERMANY
WAGES AND PRICES
Wages and Wholesale Prices. In this section the behavior of wage rates
will be compared with that of prices. Wages, as an hourly measure—
unaffected by changes in the length of the workweek—are used. As for
prices, the dollar exchange rate was used earlier in this chapter, as an
indicator of the external depreciation of the German currency. However,
the loss of the currency's internal purchasing power can be measured
more satisfactorily by German indexes of wholesale and retail prices.
TABLE 56









1913 19181V +180 ... +150 ... +138 +238
19181V 19191 +18 ... +16 ... +13 +5
1919! l92OJuly +185 ... +183 ... +409 +198
l92OJuly 1921 July +12 ... +12 ... +4 +18
1921 July 1922Ju1y +367 ... +359 ... +604 +331
1922 July 1923 July+59,480+64,007+65,808+64,913+74,248+69,753
1923 July 1923 Dec.b+3,231 2,822 2,958 +2,777+ 1,687 3,312
19191 1922July+1,385 ... +1,355 ... +3,639+1,414
1922 July 1923 Dec.b+19,251+18,088+19,495+18,054+12,542+23,135
1913 19191 +230 ... +190 ... +169 +256
1913 1920 July +840 ... +720 ... +1,267 +960
1913 1921 July +950 ... +820 ... +1,328+ 1,150
1913 1922 July+4,800+6,600+4,120+5,340 +9,959+5,290
1913 1923 Julyc+2,919 +4,295 +2,781 +3,595 +7,479+3,765
1913 1923 +94.3+ 121.2+82.3 +99.8 + 126.2+ 124.7




SOURCE:Appendix Tables A-41 and A-42.
0
Thereader is reminded that the only wholesale price index available
for the inflation period is the inadequate 48-product index that had to be
used for World War I. It consists entirely of prices of raw materials and
foods and can scarcely be regarded as more than the roughest indicator
of general wholesale price trends. Wage rates and wholesale prices are
listed in Appendix Tables A-41 and A-42, and comparisons of their
changes during specified periods are shown in Table 56. The data suggest
that between 1913 and 1919, the percentage increases of wholesale prices
did not differ greatly from increases in hourly wage rates of skilled workers.WAR, INFLATION, AND DICTATORSHIP 221
Between 1919 and mid-1922 the index of wholesale prices rose considerably
faster than that of wage rates, but from mid-1922 to the close of 1923
the situation was reversed again, with wholesale prices using 12 billion
and wage rates 19 billion times.
It is possible to conclude from the above comparisons that during the
earlier period of the inflation wage costs increased less than material costs
and possibly less than product prices, while the reverse obtained during
the hyperinflation. Bresciani-Turroni investigated the relation of wage
changes, price changes, and business conditions by comparing movements
in wage-price ratios with those in unemployment rates of union members,
and found a high degree of correlation. While stressing that he did not
attribute rising unemployment during the latter part of the inflation to
disproportionately high wage levels, he did hold that changes in the wage-
price ratios were closely related to fluctuations in unemployment and in
general business activity. The main exhibit of Bresciani-Turroni's presenta-
tion is reproduced in Chart 29. It seems to the present writer that specu-
lation about the functional relationship between the selected measures
must not neglect the concrete circumstances of the particular inflationary
phase. During the period from 1920 to mid-1922 the fall of the wage-price
ratio may have helped business,35 while during the subsequent period of
hyperinflation the rise of that ratio may have added only in a small way
to unemployment. For that period unemployment should probably be
related to more general conditions, such as the disorganization of economic
and political life in the wake of currency depreciation, the occupation of
the Ruhr, and the effects of fluctuations of prices and foreign exchange
rates on German industry.
Wages and Living Costs. For no period in German wage history have
comparisons of wages and retail prices been more urgently needed than
for the time of the Great Inflation, when changes in retail prices during
one short day could wipe out a large part of a worker's earnings. For
this reason defects in the cost-of-living index are of crucial importance,
for they can cause an altogether biased impression of the relation between
wages and retail prices. Let us consider, then, the quality of the index
available for the years 1919 to 1923.
From the Armistice to the beginning of 1920 we have only the implicit
annual deflation figures of the Statistische Reichsamt and the monthly
food-cost index of Caiwer. As can be seen from Appendix Table A-4l,
attempts to derive from these data a monthly measure approximating
living costs during the war years were continued for the immediate postwar
period. From February 1920 on, the Statistische Reichsamt compiled
It should be considered, however, that additional factors—advancing prices,
anticipation of the continuation of inflationary trends, the favorable relation of total
production costs and finished product prices at the time of sale, the "unfavorable"
rate of exchange of the German currency, and others—must have contributed to the
relatively high employment levels during the early inflationary period. (See the part
of this section dealing with Money Wage Levels.)222 WAGES IN GERMANY
and published an official cost-of-living index based on the consumption
pattern of a family of five persons and computed on a monthly basis.
The Reichsamt index is reproduced in the same appendix table.
CHART 29
Wage-Price Ratios and Unemployment During the Inflation
RQtiO Percent
Source: Appendix Table A-35 and Bresciani-Turroni, The Economics of Inflation, pp. 442 and 450.
For the inflation












which no "authoritative" cost-of-living statistics were computed. During
the first years of publication, only the food, rent, and fuel and light
groups were included in the index, in1922 a clothing group was added.
(No "miscellaneous" group was included before the end of the inflation.)
The composition of the standard budget was changed several times,
once to allow for seasonal variations in consumption, and then to adapt
the index to modifications in consumption patterns after the abolition of
wartime controls.36 The effect of these changes on the movement of the
86Rationingwas continued in Germany until 1922.
1920 1921 1922 1923
period, the coverageand quality of the available
is superior to that for earlier periods, forWAR, INFLATION., AND DICTATORSHIP 223
indexwas, however, relatively mild.37 In the earlier years of the period,
the index was based on quotations in six hundred communities, with
prices ascertained once a month during the first two years and twice a
month from 1922 on. In the spring of 1923 a weekly index, called "express
index," was computed, based on quotations in about seventy communities.
The increased frequency of price collections was prompted, of course, by
the spiraling of the inflation.
Despite attempts at systematic collection of data and the broad coverage,
cost-of-living statistics are far from satisfactory for the inflation period.
The original restriction of the index to three consumption groups was
noted above. Furthermore, scarcities of foods and other goods, wide-
spread black-market operations, and barter trading reduced the area of
consumption to which the official index could be applied. Another reason
for its inadequacy is to be found in the extent, rapidity, and diversity of
the price rises themselves, which affected the purchasing habits of the
people and rendered the index invalid beyond the day of the actual
collection of data.
The movements of the cost-of-living index naturally reflected the
consequences of the currency depreciation and thus ran roughly parallel
to changes in other variables, such as wholesale prices, wage rates, dollar
exchange rates, and real estate values. Closer comparison, however,
brings out important distinctions of detail. As can be seen from Table 56,
living costs between 1913 and the beginning of 1919 increased more than
hcurly and weekly wage rates of skilled workers.38 In the early postwar
phase of the inflation, wage rates and living costs tended to show similar
net increases, with wages sometimes outrunning the rises in living costs.
During the period of hyperinflation, however, wage rates were unable
to keep pace with retail price increases. The distinction between hourly
and weekly wages is important in the comparisons involving 1913, since
between that date and the postwar years working time declined consider-
ably. Living costs rose farther above prewar levels than weekly wages at
all times during the years 1919-23. They also rose more than hourly wages
of skilled workers and, for most of the period, more than hourly wages
of unskilled. The resultant real wages will now be discussed.
REAL WAGES
Wage Determination during the inflation. Money wages, at least in the
latter part of the inflation period, were determined in close relation to the
depreciation of the currency and to changes in the cost of living—that is,
in terms of expected real wage levels. The increasingly rapid price changes
"Forcomparison of the various forms in which the index was published, see Inter-
national Labour Office, Studies and Reports, Series D, No. 5, "The Workers' Standard
of Life in Countries with Depreciated Currencies" (Geneva, 1925), p. 42.
aaForunskilled workers we have no comparable information. The available evidence
suggests that the rise in hourly rates of unskilled workers may at times have exceeded
that in living costs.224 WAGES IN GERMANY
made it necessary to renegotiate wages more and more frequently. Within
a so-called Man teltarij' (collective agreement covering working conditions
other than wages), wage conventions were renegotiated on the average
about every two months in 1921, every month during most of 1922,
biweekly at the beginning of 1923, and weekly as the hyperinflation spiraled.
It seems that for a while negotiation of new agreements at short intervals
was preferred to sliding scale arrangements. Management assumed it would
derive some benefits from short-term stability of a cost element during
times of rising prices for finished products. Such stability facilitated cost
calculations and protected profit margins. The unions, for their part, were
reluctant to perpetuate low real wages by concluding long-term sliding
scale agreements, with a base line that reflected prevailing wage levels.
Thus, they went along with management in negotiating short-term
agreements. But the frequent bargaining over wage contracts involved
unions and management in a perpetual struggle, and thus contributed
heavily to the intensity of the labor strife which characterized this period
of the inflation.
By mid-1923, weekly renegotiation of wage covenants failed to keep
pace with the currency depreciation, and sliding scale arrangements had
to be invoked. The weekly "express" index of living costs, compiled by the
Statistische Reichsamt, came into general use as an adjustment factor for
negotiated base wages. Even this procedure proved too slow. On the day
of publication, prices usually had already exceeded those prevailing on the
day of sampling, and had further opportunity to advance during the time
required for payroll accounting, wage disbursement, and ultimate ex-
penditure by wage earners. To obviate some of these delays, many firms
used the dollar exchange rate as the adjustment factor, because this rate
could be established in up-to-date form on the day of wage payment.
This, too, had its shortcomings: the price rises between payment and
expenditure could not be compensated properly, and to forestall the rapid
dwindling of the purchasing power of earnings new devices were required.
One practice current by the summer of 1923 was to pay wages in install-
ments; that is, part of the earnings for a current week's work were paid
on Tuesday and the remainder on Friday of that week. Later the frequency
of payments was increased to three or even more times per week. By
the end of August, agreements between workers' and employers' associa-
tions specified that wages should be fixed on the basis of expected prices
in the expenditure period, rather than of prices prevailing on the date
of wage payment. This required forecasting prices, and compensatory
adjustments at the time of subsequent payments, in amounts determined
by the inaccuracies of the forecasts. The administrative problems involved
in such procedures were formidable. Forecasting and later adjustments
added to clerical work, and the process gave rise to controversies about
possible benefits accruing to employers from conservative forecasting.39
For details see Bresciani-Turroni, The Economics of Inflation, pp. 202,203, and 310.WAR, INFLATION, AND DICTATORSHIP 225
During the last months of hyperinflation, it made a difference whether
purchases were made in the morning, or in the afternoon—after the day's
dollar exchange rate was out, and stores had adjusted their prices. On
paydays workers had to be released early so they could spend at least part
of their earnings on the same day, before the further depreciation of the
morrow.
It is difficult to appreciate fully the effects of the almost continuous
price revisions on purchasing power, consumer motivation, and buying
patterns. An eye-witness report gives us some revealing details:
"I do not think that any statistics can give an adequate picture of
reality during the period of hyperinflation. How can you measure prices
which change practically every hour—as they did during the last months
of the inflation? At the end of 1923, business paid wages and salaries not
only twice a week, but every day. Collective bargaining negotiations were
continuous.
"May I give you some recollections of my own situation at that time?
As soon as I received my salary I rushed out to buy the daily necessities.
My daily salary, as editor of the periodical Soziale Praxis, was just enough
to buy one loaf of bread and either a small piece of cheese or some oat-
meal. On one occasion I had to refuse to give a lecture at a Berlin city
college because I could not be assured that my fee would cover the subway
fare to the classroom, and it was too far to walk. On another occasion,
a private lesson I gave to the wife of a farmer was paid somewhat better—
by one loaf of bread for the hour.
"An acquaintance of mine, a clergyman, came to Berlin from a suburb
with his monthly salary to buy a pair of shoes for his baby; he could buy
only a cup of coffee. The Zeiss works in Jena, a nonprofit enterprise,
calculated the gold mark equivalent of its average wage paid during a
week in November 1923 and found weekly earnings to be worth four
gold marks, less than a sixth of prewar levels."40
While the monetary depreciation progressed, certain devices introduced
elements of stability into wage payments. Some companies established
kitchens to feed their workers at least one square meal a day. Some firms
bought coal, potatoes, meat, or other necessities and distributed them to
workers as part of their remuneration. During hyperinflation, payments
in kind and personal privileges such as access to food, coal, and clothing
became tremendously important41—often exceeding the significance of
cash payments. After stabilization was decided upon in principle, wages
were increasingly negotiated in terms of gold marks, as in many wage
agreements concluded in November, 1923, and most of those concluded in
December. However, the new stabilized rentenmark currency was not
yet available at that time, and actual wage payments during the last weeks
Directcommunication from Dr. Frieda Wunderlich, New School for Social
Research, New York City.
4'Suchdeviceswere usedalso to introduce stability into other business transactions,
e.g. coal bonds, rye bonds, even kilowatt-hour bonds.226 WAGES IN GERMANY
of1923 were still made in depreciated marks or in one of the numerous
substitute currencies.
Statistical Computation of Real Wages. Usually, real wages are computed
by means of dividing money wages by cost-of-living index numbers.
In this process, the choice of corresponding time periods does not,
ordinarily, present a problem; money wages are related to retail prices
for the same month. But for the period of the Great Inflation, the rapid
changes in price levels make it desirable to juxtapose the earnings of the
workweek and the prices of the related expenditure period. But what is
the proper expenditure period for a given earnings series? The Statistische
Reichsamt, from 1920 on, divided average earnings for the calendar month
by prices for an expenditure period lagging seven days behind the work
month. And in October—November 1923, to take account of intra-weekly
wage installments and accelerated disbursements, the Reichsamt used a
lag of five days. But it is rather doubtful whether these lags provided a
realistic matching of earnings and expenditure periods. In the period of
hyperinflation, workers could scarcely have spread their purchases over
as many as five days after they received their wages.42 The waiting lines at
food stores on paydays were mute evidence of the workers' need to beat
the price spiral even by hours. On the other hand, highly perishable goods
could not be bought far in advance and larger purchases (like furniture)
could not be made without some accumulation of funds. While sometimes
there were complex installment arrangements, which adjusted separate
payments to the then existing price levels, some loss of the purchasing
power of wages through delay in shopping was unavoidable.
It is important that the reader remember, in the following discussion,
that the actual expenditure period is unknown, and that even if it were
known, proper adjustment would be difficult because we lack daily living-
cost indexes for most of the period. Moreover, the wage installments are
not separately recorded; thus, we do not know how much in a given week
was paid on Tuesday and how much on Friday. If, finally, the importance
of payments in kind is recalled, it will be readily apparent that the com-
putation of real wages during the Great inflation is a hazardous under-
taking. Below, real wages are discussed as computed by the Statistische
Reichsamt and other sources. The manner of deflation will be made
explicit wherever possible.
The Behavior of Real Wages during the Inflation. in the earlier discussion
of wage trends (Chapter 2) some important elements of real-wage behavior
during the inflation were enumerated: throughout that period, real wages
tended to be below prewar levels; real wages fluctuated significantly during
the inflation period, showing relatively high levels in 1921 and considerably
less favorable levels in 1922 and 1923. The previous discussion, however,
was based on extremely limited evidence. One single wage series (weekly
42SeeBresciani-Turroni, TheEconomics of Inflation, p. 302,and his references to
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earnings of underground coal miners in the Ruhr district) given in annual
form was used to describe real-wage behavior. This information will now
be supplemented by series covering other occupations and industries and
computed for shorter units of time.
Appendix Table A-45 presents average hourly and weekly real wage
rates based on eight industries (1913 =1).In comparison with 1913, real
hourly rates show more favorable levels than weekly real rates because of
the decline in working hours. Similarly, real rates of unskilled workers show
more favorable relative levels than those of skilled workers because of the
decline in skill differentials. Real rates of skilled workers, both hourly and
weekly, were below 1913 levels throughout the period of inflation. For
unskilled workers, weekly real rates were also below 1913 levels, whereas
hourly real rates tended to exceed prewar levels throughout the greater
part of the period 1922-23. Only in the last stages of hyperintlation did
hourly real rates for unskilled workers drop below 1913 levels. In view
of the 8-hour day and the sharing of jobs, it may be presumed that levels
of earnings, relative to 1913, did not significantly exceed those of rates.
Therefore the following comments on the relative levels of real rates may
be applied also to the approximate purchasing power of employed workers'
earnings.
With the exception of the dip in the spring of 1920, real wages tended
to rise during 1920. For skilled workers the autumn levels of 1920 were
retained through 1921. From the beginning to the end of 1922 real wages
dropped precipitously; and during 1923, after a brief upsurge in the first
months of the year, they returned to the low levels characteristic of the
greater part of the hyperinflation. Chart 30 illustrates the increasing
instability of real wage levels. While the fluctuations during the earlier
years of the inflation period are not inconsiderable, they appear mild
when measured against those occurring in 1922 and 1923.
For the inflation period as a whole, the highest and lowest levels of real
weekly wages of skilled workers, in relation to 1913, were 102 and 51
percent respectively. The comparable values for unskilled workers, for
the period covered in Appendix Table A-45, were 94 and 48. The range of
fluctuation as well as the real wage levels at the lower extreme are certainly
impressive. Yet they are based on averages of eight industries and are
therefore apt to understate the fluctuations and the extent of the decline
of real wages in less comprehensive groups. Examination of the component
industry averages provides an inkling of the remarkable instability of the
purchasing power of inflation wages. in the eight industry groups presented
in Appendix Table A-46, the index numbers range from 116 (unskilled
female textile workers, March 1923) to 25 percent (skilled woodworkers,
October 1923). Even in these monthly data there is considerable averaging-
out. Almost incredible variations occur in the real values of the weekly
wage payments to small groups or individuals. The Ailgemeine Deutsche
Gewerkschaftsbund published weekly real earnings of a fully employedCHART 30
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married printer, week by week, during the second half of 1923. In the
fifteenth pay period (October 6-12) his real earnings were given as 18.9
percent of the 1913 average.43 Robert Kuczynski computed the real values
of wage payments to Berlin chemical workers at specific dates, relating
money wages to estimated index numbers of living costs for the same date.
He found that on some occasions real wages thus derived were less than
10 percent of prewar The strong fluctuations and low levels of
real wages had effects extending beyond the decline in the economic well-
being of German workers; they also contributed to important changes in
the composition of the national product and in labor productivity.
Monetary incentives lost force with the uncertain purchasing power of
earnings and with the increasing scarcity of goods. Furthermore, after
the deprivations suffered during the war, the low real wages of the
inflation period impaired the health of the workers and their general
efficiency.
Although this study is not concerned with salary payments, it seems
pertinent at this point to mention that, on the whole, salaried workers
may have fared even worse during the inflation than wage earners. From
the salaries of government employees reproduced in Table 57, we note
that the real income of the higher-paid group declined more than that of
the lower-paid. Also, in 1923 real monthly salaries of the two higher-paid
employee groups constituted a smaller fraction of their prewar income than
the comparable payments to wage earners constituted of theirs (see
Appendix Table A-45). Prewar salaries for the higher classes of government
employees were above average wage levels for industrial wage earners.
Thus, both in the relation of real salaries to real wages and in the relation
of high salaries to low salaries, we find a reflection of the generaf trend
from "efficiency" toward "sufficiency" wages—the latter designed to
provide socially tolerable minima rather than rewards for productive
contributions.
Real Wages and Economic Activity during the Inflation. Real wages
during the Great Inflation follow, in broadest outlines, the trends of
general business activity, as may be observed from the following tabu-
lation in which production and employment indicators are compared with
ADGBJa/irbuch(Berlin,1923), p. 80. The realism of this particular quotation seems
doubtful, however. Payments on Friday were related to the cost-of-living index on the
following Monday. It is not stated whether advances were made during the week, nor
is there a discussion of the possibility that major purchases may have been made Friday
night, Saturday, or even Monday morning before the price changes occurred which
determinined that day's index.
"Robert Kuczynski, "Postwar Labor Conditions in Germany," pp. 132-33. The
estimates are derived by linear interpolation between the official index numbers of
living costs, for Mondays. The computations are free from the influence of both advanced
and postponed wage payments—the latter being a far from rare occurrence during the
time when the printing presses could scarcely keep pace with the demand for the steadily
depreciating currency. However, linear interpolation in the case of, say, a geometric
progression, might lead to overestimated living costs and underestimated real wages.230 WAGESiN GERMANY
TABLE 57
Monthly Real Salaries of Government Employees, in Three Classifications,
Large Cities, 1913-1923
(1913=100)













































SOURCE: Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1925, "Zahlen zur Geldentwertung in Deutschland,
1914 bis 1923," p. 43.
weekly real wages of skilled workers. The tendency of real wages to rise
during the early inflation years, 1920-2 1, is in general correspondence with
the economic improvements reflected in production and employment.
Index of Industrial Production
Producers'Consumers' Unemployment Ratio Weekly Real
Goods Goods of Union Members Wages
1913 =100 (percent) (1913=100)
1919 37 42 3.7 85
1920 64 56 61 3.8 72
1921 74 76 73 2.0 78
1922 80 81 78 1.5 68
1923 49 63 52 9.6 80
aThetotal index in 1921 and 1922 lies below the indexes of the producers' goods and
consumers' goods components. This cannot be entirely due to our adjustments to
postwar territory, since the data as published by the Institut für Konjunkturforschung
reveal a similar disparity.
souRcE: Production IKF Sonderheft 31, p. 64, on base 1913 =100(postwar territory)
and using 1913 to 1927-29 relationship, ibid., p. 37. See also Table 2 above. Unemploy-
ment, computed from Appendix Table A-i. Weekly real wages, skilled workers,
Appendix Table A-45.
Similarly, the low real wage levels experienced in the second half of 1922
and in 1923 correspond to the reduced increases in the annual production
data for 1922 and to the sharp decline of production and employment in
the following year. However, the short-term fluctuations apparent in
monthly unemployment data (and presumably also in production) are
not reflected in real wage changes. Conversely, the considerable short-
term fluctuations of real wages do not have their counterpart in employ-
ment (or production) fluctuations. Reasons for this lack of short-termWAR, INFLATION, AND DICTATORSHIP 231
correspondenceare not hard to find. On one hand, employment fluctuations
during the earlier inflation years appear to have been relatively mild, with
the unemployment ratio of union members during 19 19-22 rarely exceeding
5percent.Money wage rates, on the other hand, exhibited their usual
tendency to withstand short-term pressures toward downward adjustment,
but were affected by the strong monetary forces making for increases
during that time. The insufficiently coordinated movements of wages and
living costs led to fluctuations in real wages much sharper than those shown
by the comparatively smooth unemployment record.
Several of the annual real wage series record levels lower in 1920 than
in 1919. This showing might be explained in part by the unreliability of
living-cost computations in 1919, the strong decrease in real wages during
the first few months of 1920, and the fact that after 1920 the computation
of real wages was based on a cost-of-living index which lagged seven
days behind the earnings month. But even after allowance for these
statistical problems, real wage levels can have increased only moderately
between those two years despite an apparent increase of about 45percent
in the industrial production index.
The peculiar conditions of economic reconstruction during the im-
mediate postwar years may shed some light on this seeming inconsistency.
The year 1919, as compared with the preceding war year, witnessed a
strong reduction of producers' goods output and a relatively fast recovery
of consumers' goods. This was a consequence of economic demobilization
and of the pressing need to feed, clothe, and warm the war-weary defeated
population. In the following year there was a sharp change in emphasis;
reconstruction of productive resources was now the immediate goal.
The index of producers' goods output rose from 37 to 64 in 1920. Although
the output recovery of the goods included in the index might have been
faster than of producers' goods at large, there can be no doubt that during
its prosperous phase the inflation was a producers' goods rather than a
consumers' goods boom. Emphasis on producers' goods output was
stimulated in part by the need to replace the destroyed, outworn, or ceded
capital equipment. It was enhanced also by the government's activity in
road and canal building, electrification, and other projects designed to
reduce demobilization unemployment and to help in reconstruction.
Most important, perhaps, were the effects of the inflation itself. The
huge profits accruing from sales at ever-increasing price levels, a tax
system not adapted to claim any substantial share of these profits, and
the urge to protect cash assets against depreciation led businessmen to
augment their properties. Companies built factories, replaced their war-
worn equipment, even bought more than they could expect to use. In a
curious mixture of aggressive and defensive speculation, producers acquired
raw materials, piled up semifinished goods, and held on to finished
inventories. They were motivated not only by the wish to assure "profits"
from the rising price level; they saw also in the accumulation of producers'232 WAGESIN GERMANY
goods one of the few available means of protecting their assets.45 The
emphasis on producers' goods dovetailed effectively with the lag of money
wages behind wholesale and retail prices, which tended to reduce labor
costs and to decrease the share of the national product available to
consumers. Note also that agricultural output destined primarily for
domestic consumption was especially low during the first postwar years,
that some part of the national product went into reparations, and that
unfavorable exchange rates stimulated exports. These factors kept business
activity in high gear during the early postwar years, while consumers'
goods production and real wages hovered about relatively low levels.
Indeed, in those years the beneficial aspects of inflation seemed so obvious
to some of Germany's outstanding businessmen that they regarded
efforts aimed at stabilizing or raising the value of the currency as an
invitation to catastrophe.46 This attitude was perhaps encouraged by a
Reichsbank credit policy which permitted expansion of corporations,
acquisition of competing enterprises, and retirement of industrial bonds at
practically no cost—since loans could be repaid in depreciated currency.
From the autumn of 1922 to the end of 1923 real wages changed in
conformity with deteriorating general economic conditions. The high
replacement costs of merchandise sold led to a gradual decrease, and in
some cases a virtual disappearance, of inventories. Declining productivity
impaired the favorable export position of German manufacturers. As
wage rates caught up with wholesale prices the much-touted cost-price
advantages of the early inflation vanished. Producers now frequently
found themselves in possession of capital equipment which increased
their obligations without contributing either to production or to increased
productivity. In the face of declining production, growing unemploy-
ment, and vacant shelves in the food stores, wages lost more and more
ground in their race with living costs. Both consumers' goods and pio-
ducers' goods output declined materially from 1922 to 1923, and with
them real wages and the standard of living. According to some sources,
conditions were as bad or worse than during the preceding war. The cities
were in an extremely precarious situation regarding food supply, since
farmers refused to deliver produce except in exchange for goods. And again,
as during the last years of the war, access to friends or relatives in the
country was more important for survival than money or real wages.
Because of the unsatisfactory nature of the data on money wages and
living costs for the period of hyperinflation, it is desirable to check the
major results of the computation of real wages against other evidence.
Information on per capita consumption provides some such measures
(see Table 58).Thesharply reduced consumption of important commodities
is noteworthy, whether consumption during the entire inflation is compared
See IKE Sonderheft31,pp.25if.; and Bresciani-Turroni, The Economics of
Inflation, pp.196-97.
46Bresciani-Turroni,ibid., p.191.WAR, iNFLATION, AND DICTATORSHiP 233
TABLE58
Per Capita Consumption of Selected Goods, 1913 and 1920-1923
(1913= 100)
1913 1920 1921 1922 1923
Potatoes boa 47a 80a 62a
Rice 100 81 132" 66 69

























Cocoa 100 96 161" 177 104
Coffee 100 27 50" 24 25













a Fiscalyear, starting July 1.
b May-December1921.
Fiscalyear, ending August 31.
SOURCE:IKFSonderheft 3l,p. 27; and Jahrbuch 1924-25,pp. 306ff.,and 1930,pp.400ff.
with that of 1913, or consumption of 1923 is compared with that of earlier
inflation years. It is likely, of course, that some of the figures, particularly
those for domestic goods, may understate true consumption. Barter
arrangements and distribution by private channels may have caused many
a head of cattle or sack of potatoes to escape the statistical enumerator.
But the information on consumption of beer and cotton goods is less
likely to be distorted, and these data show similarly low levels. All in
all, it can be said that both the index numbers of industrial production
and the scattered data on per capita consumption tend to corroborate
the broad findings on real wage levels during the inflation. These levels
were substantially below, and during the last phases of the crisis pitifully
below, the real wages that prevailed before the outbreak of World War I.
Wages under National
GENERAL
Labor Market Changes. This section treats the last of the unusual
episodes in the Reich's history—the period of National Socialism, lasting
For thematerialin this section the author is .indebted to prior studies of German
wage conditions. Especially instructive are three articles by René Livchen in International
LabourReview, August 1942, December 1943, and July 1944; John P. Umbach's article
on "Labor Conditions in Germany," Monthly Labor Review, U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, March 1945; Jurgen Kuczynski's Germany under Fascis,n, 1933 to the Present
Day, Vol. iii, Part 2 of A Short History of Labour Conditions under Industrial Capitalism
(London, 1944); and Otto Nathan's The Nazi Economic System; Germany's Mobilization234 WAGES IN GERMANY
from 1933 to 1945. The advent of National Socialism wrought dramatic
changes in the political and economic structure of Germany. During most
of the period there was an expansion of business activity. But since the
social product, particularly in the war phases of the expansion, consisted
increasingly of arms, supplies for the armed forces, and the means of
producing and transporting such material, the customary benefits of
accelerated business activity and high employment accrued to the German
people only to a very limited degree.
The labor policy of the National Socialist regime and the principal
measures of wage control have been outlined previously,48 though scant
attention has been paid to the enormous changes in the composition of
the work force. During the early years of National Socialism, when the
creation of jobs for heads of families was a primary concern of the regime,
the most important changes in the composition of the work force were
probably an increase in the proportion of unskilled workers and a decrease
in the proportion of employed women. Later, the armament drive aug-
mented the relative importance of producers' goods industries. The aim
of economic self-sufficiency also affected the industrial distribution of the
work force. And finally, when war increasingly drew Germany's man-
power into the armed services, the ranks of the employed were replenished
by more extensive use of female workers, by recruitment of youths,
the aged, the handicapped, and by employment of voluntary or impressed
foreign workers and prisoners of war. The labor supply was stretched
further by compulsory service of civilians at military constructions, the
"Farm Year" for German girls, furloughs to military men for industrial
or agricultural employment, increased part-time work by mothers, and
by similar arrangements.
The net effect of the wartime labor recruitment measures was merely
to maintain the level of the civilian labor force in the face of the heavy
military draft. At the same time, the skill, age, sex, regional, industrial,
and ethnic composition of the employed population changed drastically.
Despite the extreme needs for manpower during the war, the number of
native Germans in the total labor force (civilian and armed services)
barely increased after 1939. The native civilian labor force shrank, of
course, but this was at least partly compensated by a large influx of
foreigners. The result was an over-all decline of the total civilian labor
forWar (DukeUniversity Press, 1944), Chapters 7, 8, and 10.Theseauthors studied
labor market and wage control (Livchen, Nathan), actual wage behavior (Livchen,
Umbach, Kuczynski) and labor conditions other than wages (Kuczynski, Nathan).
Within the limited scope of the present section their findings will be reported to the
extent necessary for an understanding of the atypical behavior of wages under NatiOnal
Socialism. Readers interested in the problems of totalitarian labor market administration
or in- the working and living conditions of industrial labor during the Third Reich
should consult these studies directly.
"See Chapter 1, last pages of the section on Determination of Wages and Working
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force (natives and foreigners) from 39.4 million in 1939 to 36.1 million
in
Wage and Labor Allocation Policies. The policies of National Socialism
on wages and the labor market5° were subordinate to its major economic
program, designed to bring the national product to a maximum, and
within that product the portion devoted to military needs. A corollary
of the emphasis on military needs was the reduction of civilian con-
sumption to a minimum compatible with social acceptance—a policy
described by the slogan, "guns before butter." Labor recruitment plus
a combination of low basic rates and an efficiency wage system were to
swell the national product. The shift toward "essential" output was
furthered by material allocation, increasingly stringent employment
controls, and greater earnings opportunities in war industries. Limitation
of civilian consumption was brought about by wage-rate stabilization,
taxes, quasi-compulsory contributions, and forced savings. Most of the
labor market and wage-control measures, developed during the prewar
years, were tightened during the war period. The differences between the
labor and wage policies of the two world wars are striking: the earlier
improvised, barely coordinated, and poorly implemented regulations
were replaced by a preparedness policy and an administrative control
apparatus developed for about six years before actual military operations
began.
Wage rates were virtually stabilized by the regime at the lowest levels
struck in the course of the Great Depression. While these were minimum
rates and theoretically could be exceeded, during the first years of National
Socialism unemployment was still substantial, acting as a brake on excess
payments. Furthermore, the expressed policy was not to increase rates
until all unemployment had been absorbed. Later, when improving
employment conditions tended to exert upward pressure on wage rates,
the restraining actions of the labor trustees prevented more than nominal
advances. Even under war conditions the rigid control of wage rates was
relaxed only to permit adjustments of the most glaring inequities. From
1938 on, when payments above the minima became more frequent, the
labor trustees were empowered to fix maximum wages in certain in-
dustries.5' And after the launching of the war the trustees were actually
required to set compulsory wage maxima.52
The National Socialist regime could not rest satisfied with controlling
wage rates. There was the economic necessity for wages to maintain or
increase their incentive function, for more hours to be worked, and at
Forstatistical details and interpretation of these changes see Clarence D. Long,
The Labor Force in War andTransition,Four Countries, Occasional Paper 36, (NationaL
Bureau of Economic Research, 1952), pp. 17 if. and 37 if.
Seealso Chapter 1, last pages of the section on Determination of Wages and
Working Conditions.
5!Decreeof June 25, 1938.
52WarEconomy Order of September 4, 1939.236 WAGESIN GERMANY
the same time, for wage earners' income to be prevented from rising
unduly, The very rigidity of rates, in the face of rising prices, naturally
strengthened the incentive to earn more. Increasing use was made of
piece work in order to relate wage payments more closely to output and
thus to induce greater exertion. Redetermination of piece rates in cases of
"excessive" earnings, and a tough policy of establishing low basic
efficiency rates, where there were new products or changed specifications,
served to maintain earnings incentives. The workers found that they had
to work longer hours and produce more goods if they were to maintain or
to raise their plane of living.
At the same time the regime had to limit civilian claims on consumers'
goods—the increase of earnings had to be kept under control. Since the
drive for large total output implied high levels of employment and hours,
the control had to be applied to the manageable factors making for the
excess of hourly earnings over rates.53 Such factors included voluntary
overpayments, circumvention of wage stabilization orders by spurious
promotions, gratuitous premium payments, special bonuses, paid vacations,
payments into savings funds, payments of insurance or tax contributions
by the employer, and so forth. In addition, there were, of course, bona
fide promotions to higher paying jobs, increased incidence of work at
premium rates, and establishment of favorable base rates in work re-
munerated on an output basis. In practically all these areas the govern-
ment intervened to limit increases in earnings.
As previously noted, voluntary payments above minimum rates were
prohibited. Circumvention of rate regulations was countered by an order
requiring specific permission before revision of wage schedules, re-
classification of occupations, or changes in the terms of employment.TM
Unwarranted payment of special premiums was made a punishable
offense. il3ona fide promotions were not discouraged, but improvement of
a worker's earnings position simply by transferring him into a better-
paying establishment or industry was curtailed; such changes were made
subject to the approval of the employment exchanges.55 The authorities
tried first to abolish, and later to modify, premium payments for overtime,
night and holiday work, but in order to maintain morale they finally
had to reinstitute these payments on their old scale.56 Also for newly
created occupations, or employment of a new type of worker in an
The shift from low-paying consumers' goods industries to higher-paying producers'
goods industries, for instance, was not suitable for intervention within the framework
of basic policies. However, even in that case, the wage rate stabilization prevented the
development of extreme wage disparities and thus helped to curb the effects of inter-
industry shifts.
Decreeof June 25, 1938. The decree was not very successful, according to Livchen,
op.cit., Aug.1942, p. 139. An order of April 25, 1941 required consent of the labor
trustees before a worker could be promoted.
Ordersof December 29, 1934; February 11, 1937; September 1, 1939.
56Ordersof September 4, 1939; November 16, 1939; November 17, 1939; December
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establishedoccupation, the government saw to it that wages were kept at
what it considered "economic" levels. Women replacing men received
80 percent of men's rates on time, but the same rates on piece work.57
And in the employment of "substandard" labor, undercutting of normal
rates was permitted.58 Foreigners, prisoners of war, and other irregulars
were remunerated at special reduced rates. In order to limit earnings
derived from piece work, the government introduced in some industries
an interesting system of efficiency wages, whereby average earnings levels
could be held fairly constant.59 Throughout the war period the govern-
ment insisted on frequent redetermination of basic piece rates. This was
done, not only to curtail purchasing power, but also to maintain the
incentive function of the piece rates in cases of rising output per man.
Physical scarcities of goods deprived "extra" money earnings
of much of their practical value. Prompt adjustment of piece rates forced
workers to exert themselves in order to make ends meet.
The requirement that workers must obtain permission for job changes
has been mentioned. There was indeed a close interrelation between wage
and mobility controls. If wages were to be stabilized or nearly stabilized
it was necessary (1) to remove the pressures on wage levels set up by any
spontaneous movement of workers to higher-paying industries, occu-
pations, localities, and so on, and (2) to set up alternative, allocating
mechanisms to shift labor to places where workers were needed. Thus
wage stabilization required both a restrictive and an affirmative control
of mobility. Conversely, to support a system of labor allocation, it was
necessary to limit wage inducements leading to undesired mobility. The
National Socialist government developed wage and mobility controls in
close correspondence. A decree of August 1934 and an Act of November
1935 gave to the Reich Institute of Employment Services exclusive power
over work placement, vocational guidance, and assignment of apprentices.
Under a law of February 1935, all important categories of workers6°
received workbooks for recording their training, work history, and other
pertinent facts. These workbooks became a most important tool of labor
allocation. Even before the outbreak of the war, hiring and firing in
certain industries were subject to the consent of the employment office.
After September 1939 the administration of labor allocation was tightened.
A change of job before permission was granted became a criminal act.
The right to control job changes and conscript labor gave the authorities
complete power to freeze or shift labor at will. They used these powers
extensively.6'
Reichsarbeitsblatt 1940, p. 301; circular to labor trustees.
58Decreeof October 15, 1935. See also Nathan, op. cit., p. 186.
The efficiency ratings controlled the distribution of earnings rather than their
average levels. See Umbach, op. cit., p. 511.
60By1939 about 36 million workers were covered.
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CHANGES IN MONEY WAGE LEVELS
Wage Rates. Wage rates had decreased by 21 percent from their high
prosperity plateau to the trough in general business conditions reached
in August 1932. Although business activity and labor market conditions
started to improve from that time on, wage rates continued to decline
through October 1932, and experienced another small downward adjust-
ment from February to March 1933. It was at this level that the National
Socialist regime introduceditsstabilization program.62 The virtual
62During1933 wage rates were kept stable by administrative measures. The labor
act of January 20, 1934 gave to the labor trustees formal sanction to regulate wages
in their districts.
stability of money wage rates during the subsequent six years is without
parallel in German wage history. Up to 1933 wage rates had increased
in all expansions and in most of the milder contractions. During 1933-39
they rose less than 1 percent despite a spectacular spurt in production
and employment, and in the face of a tightening labor market. The follow-
ing tabulation compares employment and wage-rate changes between








SOURCE: Appendix Tables A-i and A-2.
Up to 1937, the wage administration merely perpetuated the level and
structure of wages as they had developed in the course of the collective
bargaining efforts, arbitration awards, and emergency decrees of the
Weimar Republic. Later the labor trustees bçgan to make minor adjust-
ments where special inducements were needed or where major inequities
existed. Before the outbreak of World War II wage rates of building,
mining, textile, and farm workers were increased slightly, and some regional
differentials, which had created difficulties in connection with the allocation
of workers to plants in eastern Germany, were reduced. Altogether, the
adjustments made before World War II led to a rise of less than 1 percent
in the wage-rate index. Even under the pressures of the war in progress
the stability of wage rates was largely preserved; between 1939 and 1944.
a further rise in wage rates amounted to only 2 percent.
Between 1933 and 1944 the total rate increase came to less than 3 percent.
In evaluating this finding we must, however, keep some qualifications in
mind. First, the reported rates were rates and were on occasion
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with regard to the relation between time rates and piece rates; in fact,
however, piece rates—usually about 15 percent higher than time rates—
gained in importance. Third, the index is standardized with regard to
sex, age, skill, and industrial composition and does not reflect any shifts
among these categories. Fourth, despite the regime's attempts to prevent
circumvention of the wage stabilization measures, there was a good deal
of wage adjustment by subterfuge.
Earnings. The stabilization of wage rates dampened, but by no means
prevented, fluctuations in earnings. Table 59 compares the movements of
TABLE 59
Average Hourly Wage Rates, and Average Hourly and Weekly Earnings,
1932-1944
Year Hourly RatesHourly EarningsWeekly Earnings
1932 =100
1929 122.4 132.7 149.4
1932 100.0 100.0 100.0
1933 97.0 96.9 102.2
1934 96.8 99.3 109.7
1935 96.8 100.8 122.3
1936 96.8 102.5 116.6
1937 97.0 104.6 120.6
1938 97.4 108.2 126.5
1939 97.9 111.3 131.3
1940 97.9 113.9 135.2
1941 98.8 119.2 144.0
1942 99.4 121.1 144.9
1943 99.6 122.0 145.5
1944 99.6 121.8 143.8
1939 =100
1929 125.0 119.2 113.8
1939 100.0 100.0 100.0
1940 100.0 102.4 103.0
1941 101.0 107.1 109.7
1942 101.6 108.8 110.4
1943 101.8 109.6 110.9
1944 101.8 109.5 109.6
SOURCE: Based on data in Wirtschaft und Statistik, passim; Jahrbuch, passim; Handbuch
1928-44, passim. For details see source to Appendix Table A-2.
hourly rates, hourly earnings, and weekly earnings. By 1944 hourly wage
rates had' just about regained 1932 levels, hourly earnings were 22 percent
above 1932, and weekly earnings 44 percent. In both hourly and weekly
earnings the rate of increase slowed down appreciably after 1941. Between
1943 and 1944 there were actual declines. This behavior reflects the major240 WAGESIN GERMANY
military and economic experiences of the war—the two initial years of
economic and military successes; the subsequent period of all-out war,
beginning with the Russian campaign and ending with the major reverses
in North Africa and Russia; and the final years of retreat and defeat.
During the early war years hourly and weekly earnings rose. Their sub-
sequent leveling-out is to be explained largely by the fact that by 1941
working hours had been expanded close to socially tolerable limits.
Furthermore, raw materials shortages, air raid warnings, and bomb
damage began to cut into operations, and the more extensive use of
substandard labor (such as juveniles, invalids, elderly people) also affected
the averages. Thus from 1943 onward, these factors led to actual declines
in hourly as well as in weekly earnings.
The behavior of earnings under National Socialism can be traced in
greater detail on the basis of quarterly measures. Index numbers of
average hourly and average weekly earnings for all industry are available
fro:m the third quarter of 1933, and presented in Table 60. From December
1935 on, the quarterly data on earnings distinguish hourly and weekly
earnings, earnings for men and women, earnings for skilled and unskilled,
and earnings for producers' and consumers' goods industries (Table
61). The quarterly data in general show a relatively smooth progression,
particularly in the hourly-wages series. Weekly earnings reveal more
conspicuous short-term fluctuations, both seasonal and nonseasonal.
Occasionally we are able to gauge the effect of statistical standardiza-
tion on the earnings measures. The official earnings index is standardized
for skill, age, sex, and industrial composition.63 While in its standardized
form the hourly index increased by about 23 percent between 1933 and
1941, the same measure with currently changing industry weights would
show a rise of about 33 percent. The difference provides some indication
of the effect of shifts of wage earners toward higher-paying industries.
Average earnings for all wage earners in a sample of large enterprises
exhibit trends basically similar to those traced by the highly standardized
earnings indexes previously described. And the same is true for averages
computed from income distributions in certain insurance statistics.64
Obviously, the standardizations employed in the official index affect that
index in different directions. While standardization of industrial com-
position, for instance, dampens the rise of the measure, standardization
of sex composition tends to boost it. Our comparison of the various
measures suggests that the official index, apart from fulfilling its specific
function, also provides a fair indication of approximate changes in the
unweighted average of earnings for all German wage earners.
Wage Changes and Wage Control. The unusual degree of wage stability
in the face of rapidly, rising employment has been mentioned previously.
68Fordetails on the construction of the index see Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1936, pp.
283-286.
SeeLivchen, op. cit., December 1943, p. 725, for data and more detailed discussion.WAR, INFLATION, AND DICTATORSHIP 241
TABLE60
Average Hourly and Average Weekly Earnings, All Industry, 1933-1943
(1936 =100)
EARNINGS
Year and Month Hourly Weekly
1933 Sept. 94.7 87.8
Dec. 95.8 91.5




































1943 Mar. 119.3 126.5
souRcE:Wirtschaftund Statist/k, 1938,p. 159; 1939, p. 520;and 1943, p. 279.242 WAGESIN GERMANY
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Year and MonthIndustriesGoods GoodsSemiskilled UnskilledSemiskilled Unskilled
1935 Dec. 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1936Mar. 100.4 100.4 100.5 100.4 100.3 100.7 100.3
June 100.8 100.9 100.4 101.0 100.4 100.5 100.2
Sept. 101.3 101.4 100.9 101.5 100.6 101.1 100.9
Dec. 101.7 101.9 100.8 102.0 101.1 101.2 101.7
1937 Mar. 102.4 102.6 101.6 102.6 101.5 102.3 102.3
June 102.5 102.7 101.3 102.9 101.5 101.8 101.5
Sept. 103.5 103.8 101.8 104.0 102.6 102.1 102.8
Dec. 104.3 104.8 101.7 104.9 103.3 101.7 103.9
1938 Mar. 104.7 105.1 102.7 105.5 103.6 102.5 104.3
June 105.3 105.9 103.3 106.1 104.9 103.1 104.3
Sept. 107.7 108.2 105.1 108.4 107.2 105.1 106.9
Dec.a 109.0 109.5 106.2 109.8 107.8 106.0 108.8
1939 Mar. 109.3 109.7 106.9 110.0 108.1 107.0 109.1
June 110.9 111.3 108.3 111.7 109.9 108.2 110.2
Sept. 108.5 108.6 107.2 109.4 106.6 107.3 109.8
Dec. 110.5 110.7 108.5 111.0 109.6 108.5 110.0
1940Mar. 111.2 111.3 109.8 111.8 109.4 110.1 111.9
June ... ... ... ...
Sept. 113.6 113.7 112.8 114.6 111.6 114.0 113.7
Dec. 115.8 115.9 114.5 116.7 113.8 115.1 115.4
1941 Mar. 116.8 116.8 116.7 117.8 114.1 117.9 117.0
Juiie .. . . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . .
Sept. 118.7 118.6 119.0 119.6 116.2 120.6 119.3
Dec.b 119.3 119.3 119.5 120.2 116.8 120.8 120.0
1942 Mar. 118.9 118.9 119.7 120.1 115.4 121.4. 119.9
June ... ... ... ...
Sept. 120.3 120.3 121.3 121.9 116.2 122.9 119.9
Dec. 120.9 120.9 121.7 122.4 1.16.9 123.0 120.7
1943 Mar. 120.7 120.7 122.5 122.1 117.1 123.6 119.4
Beginning December 1938, including Austna.
b Beginning December 1941,includingSudetenland and eastern territories incorporated into the
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Year and MonthIndustriesGoods GoodsSemiskilled UnskilledSemiskilled Unskilled
1935 Dec. 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1936 Mar. 99.9 99.4 102.1 99.9 99.7 102.6 98.6
June 102.0 101.7 103.4 102.1 101.9 102.1 99.6
Sept. 103.1 102.7 105.2 103.2 102.6 104.6 99.9
Dec. 105.0 104.5 106.5 105.6 102.9 107.0 103.9
1937 Mar. 104.7 104.3 106.1 105.2 102.6 106.4 103.1
June 105.4 105.1 106.3 105.8 104.5 105.0 101.7
Sept. 106.3 105.9 108.2 106.5 105.9 106.6 102.7
Dec. 108.1 107.6 110.6 108.9 105.2 109.4 105.9
1938 Mar. 107.8 107.3 110.2 108.9 105.5 108.7 103.8
June 108.2 107.7 110.6 109.1 106.7 107.7 103.5
Sept. 113.5 112.9 116.4 114.3 113.3 114.2 107.4
Dec.a 115.2 114.4 119.8 116.5 111.9 118.2 111.5
1939 Mar. 113.9 113.1 118.6 115.3 110.6 116.7 109.2
June 117.4 116.8 120.7 118.8 116.4 116.9 109.6
Sept. 113.4 113.4 112.7 115.1 112.0 107.1 106.5
Dec. 116.9 117.1 114.2 118.7 116.5 108.6 107.2
1940 Mar. 115.7 115.4 116.3 117.7 112.3 111.2 106.4.
June ... ... ... ... ...
Sept. 122.2 121.5 125.1 124.8 119.0 121.0 108.8
Dec. 123.9 123.1 128.6 126.4 119.8 123.8 111.7
1941 Mar. 125.4 124.7 129.1 128.3 121.1 123.7 112.0
June ... ... ... ... ...
Sept. 128.3 127.6 131.8 131.3 125.1 126.2 113.6
Dec) 127.5 126.7 131.5 130.5 122.3 125.6 113.9
1942 Mar. 126.7 126.1 130.2 130.4 120.0 124.3 111.7
June ... ... ... ... ... ...
Sept. 128.1 127.5 131.4 132.0 122.8 123.3 109.7
Dec. 129.5 129.0 132.2 133.6 124.2 124.4 110.0
1943 Mar. 129.6 128.9 134.0 134.1 123.9 125.8 107.3
souRcE: Wirtschaft undStatistik, 1937,p. 515; 1938, pp. 691, 1011; 1939, p. 235; 1941, p. 121; and
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TABLE 62
SkillDifferentials,Average Hourly andWeeklyEarnings, by Industry,
Selected Years, 1936-1944
(differences between earnings of skilled and earnings of unskilled









Hard coal 24.126.227.9... 19.423.325.8
Iron ore 20.921.422.3... 17.818.417.6
Iron and steela 17.919.419.622.0 20.725.924.426.6




Electrical goods 29.832.131.934.9 31.634.534.038.4
Instruments 31.834.433.133.5 32.735.534.734.7
Chemicalsb ...23.223.0 ...26.227.7
Rubber and products ... 17.318.3 ... 24.125.1
Stone and clay 15.1°22.421.724.1 16.2°24.924.928.4
Potteryc ... 22.121.926.6 ...21.019.829.1














b Unskilled vs. foremen.
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We can best observe the results of wage-rate stabilization by a comparison
of conditions in the two world wars. During World War! wage rates about
doubled; during World War II they rose by only 2 percent, a sharp con-
trast, indeed. The success of the National Socialist regime in keeping
money wage rates close to their depression levels cannot be gainsaid,
though it appears to have surprised some of the wage administrators
themselves !65
Theeffects of controls on the course of earnings are brought out in a
comparison of earnings and employment between 1929 and 1939. Though
employment in 1939 was considerably above its previous prosperity levels,
hourly as well as weekly earnings were materially lower. These comparisons
do not indicate the separate effect of wage controls, since price levels in
1939 also were below those of 1929 (see Appendix Tables A-i and A-2).
The effectiveness of controls upon earnings during the war is illustrated
by comparison of the records of the two world wars; during World
War I earnings increased [20 to 150 percent, during World War II about
10 percent.
Some of the control measures are reflected directly in the short-term.
movements of the quarterly wage record. For example, the fluctuations
observed shortly after the outbreak of World War II must be interpreted
in terms of the war emergency decree and its later modifications. Both
hourly and weekly earnings were temporarily reduced upon the abolition
of premium payments.°6 However, the principal result of the Nazi control
measures lies in their gradual, cumulative effects on earnings levels—in
keeping with the over-all objectives of the regime's economic policy.
WAGE DIFFERENTIALS°7
Skill Differentials. As a result of the wage-rate stabilization program,
changes in the rate structure were few and of minor importance. Thus,
any analysis of skill differentials under National Socialism must be based
on earnings.
Table 61 shows that both hourly and weekly earnings of skilled workers
rose faster than those of unskilled workers. The deviations became more
pronounced after the beginning of World War II. The data imply a widen-
ing of skill differentials during both the prewar and the war period, thus
reversing the long-term tendencies which prevailed in prior decades.
Skill differentials in percentage form can be derived on an industry-by-
industry basis from the breakdown of hourly and weekly earnings statistics
by industry, skill, and sex. The basic data are found in Appendix Table
A-47 and the differentials in Table 62. The skill differentials range from as
op. cit., p. 185.
66SeeChapter 1, last pages of the section on Determination of Wages and Working
Conditions. Part of the drop might also have been due to indirect effects of restrictions
on use of raw materials in consumers' industries.
As elsewhere in this study, differentials represent differences between wages of
higher-paid and lower-paid workers, expressed in percent of the former.246 WAGESIN GERMANY
much as 40 percent in the case of weekly earnings in the machinery industry
in March 1944, to a mere 7 percent in the case of weekly earnings of women
in the pottery industry in 1936. In the great majority of industries, skill
differentials conformed to the trend of the aggregate measure—that is,
they widened between 1936 and 1939 as well as during the war itself.
This behavior presumably reflects the greater relative scarcity of skilled
labor, particularly in armament industries.
The scarcity of information on skill differentials for the period of
World War I makes it impossible to carry out any quantitative comparison
of their behavior in the two conflicts. We have noted that, in general,
skill differentials in war industries tended to widen during the first war,
while those in civilian industries more frequently narrowed. The situation
was similar during the second war. However, the changes in differentials
observable for World War I were more drastic than those for World
War II (see Tables 50 and 62), as would be expected in view of the controls,
which dampened all changes in wage levels and in the wage structure
during the twelve years of National Socialism.
Sex When the National Socialists took power they re-
garded most industrial employment of women with disapproval. This
was in keeping with their Herrenmenschen ideology, which emphasized
the domestic functions of the German woman; more important, it was a
correlative of their employment policy, which aimed above all to create
industrial jobs for family supporters. Although in the course of the sub-
sequent expansion the employment of women increased, the regime
concentrated its initial employment program on male workers. Between
1932 and 1937, employed male membership in sickness insurance funds
(in the Reich territory of 1937) rose from 8.2 million to 13.0 million, but
female membership only from 4.8 to 5.9 million—with a reduction of
women's share in total employment from 37 percent to 31 percent. With
the approach of high employment levels and the drafting of men into the
armed forces, the regime began to take a more kindly view of the in-
dustrial employment of women. From 1937 on, the number and share of
women in total employment grew rapidly, from 5.9 million in 1937, to
6.9 million in 1939, and to more than 9.0 million in 1944—a rise from 31
to 33, and finally to 44 percent in the three respective years.68 The final
desperate attempts of the Nazi rulers to ward off defeat in the war relied
heavily on the last remaining human resource—female labor. The total
mobilization measures following the attempt on Hitler's life in July 1944
included compulsory registration of women up to the age of 50 for war-
work. A decree of February 1945 ordered conscription of all women
between 16 and 60 years old for auxiliary work with the Volkssturm,
68SeeHandbuch 1928-44, p. 478. The basic data exclude armed services and war
prisoners, but include foreign workers. For a discussion of the relatively small additions
of native German women to the labor force see Long, The Labor Force in War and
Transition, Four Countries (Occasional Paper 36, National Bureau of Economic Re-
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butempowered local leaders to assign the women to other types of work
where needed.69 In view of these extreme measures to recruit women
workers it is remarkable that the statistics do not seem to indicate any
substantial rise in the percentage of women in the native labor force.7°
The mounting necessity of putting women to work in manufacturing
gave rise to many changes. It required technical adjustment of machinery
and jobs to female aptitudes and physical strength. It also furthered
shifts on the ideological "front"—the emphasis on woman's role in the
home gave way to a demand that she fufill her responsibility to the nation.7'
Finally it caused adaptation of wage policies to the new employment
needs. What, then, was the effect of these revised policies upon wage
behavior as reflected in sex differentials?
The relative stability of wage rates during World War II precluded any
significant changes in sex differentials. More interesting is the behavior
of sex differentials in earnings. For hourly earnings, changes in sex
differentials from December 1935 to the end of the war were rather small.
In weekly earnings, men experienced substantially larger wage increases
than women. As the labor market tightened men worked longer hours
than women; and part-time work, which reduces the statistical average
of weekly earnings, became more prevalent for women than for men.
(See Table 61.) Sex differentials did not necessarily change in the same
direction for skilled and unskilled workers. Note for instance, that during
the war, hourly and even weekly earnings of skilled and semiskilled
women increased faster than those of men, but the earnings of unskilled
women rose more slowly. The difference is not difficult to explain. With
the relentless recruitment of men into the armed services, women began
to invade occupations and to shoulder responsibilities previously denied
to them. Such opening of new earnings opportunities was more con-
spicuous in t.he skilled than in the unskilled trades.72
Sex differentials can be computed in percentage form, by industry, for
1936 and subsequent years. They are presented in Table 63. For average
weekly earnings, the trend is almost without exception toward a slight
widening of the differentials, which must be traced to the fact that the
increase in hours was more pronounced for male than for female workers.
69Umbach,op. cit. p. 502.
Forstatistical support and discussion of this thesis, see Long, The Labor Force
in War and Transition, Four Countries, pp. 37 and 40-45.
Intheir attempts to reconcile the new policies with their basic ideology the leaders
of National Socialist women's organizations may well have established a record in free
interpretation of terms. They had previously declared that woman's place was in the
home, but now women were needed in industry. Hence "home" was redefined as what-
ever can be "encompassed by the spirit of motherhood," and thus they could state that
"our home is Germany, wherever she may need us." See Ruth KOhler-Irrgang, Die
Sendungder Frau inder Deutschen Geschichte (Leipzig, 1940), p. 235.
72Asa corollary to this situation, the growth in earnings of skilled women exceeded
that of unskilled women substantially more than the growth in earnings of skilled men
exceeded that of unskilled men.248 WAGESIN GERMANY
TABLE 63
Sex Differentials, Average Hourly and Weekly Earnings, by Industry,
Selected Years, 1936-1944
(differences between earnings of male and earnings of female workers,








Female vs. male unskilled ...35.635.032.3 ...38.741.147.0
Foundries
Female vs. male unskilled ...27.027.330.5 ...33.635.446.4
Metalworking
Female vs. male unskilled 23.123.124.126.8 26.027.129.743.6
Machinery
Female vs. male unskilled 24.821.622.725.5 27.927.829.744.5
Electrical goods
Female vs. male unskilled 24.721.521.523.9 27.025.127.040.3
Instruments
Female vs. male unskilled 26.724.725.728.8 29.728.729.847.6
Chemicals
Female vs. male unskilled ...34.434.0 ...38.540.3
Rubber and products
Female vs. male unskilled ...38.436.8 ... 41.141.4
Stone and clay
Female vs. male unskilled 35.334.132.334.5 36.737.736.444.2
Pottery
Female skilled vs. male skilled ...45.844.742.5 ...48.648.153.8
Female unskilled vs. male unskilled ...39.939.033.6 ...43.944.046.3
Glass
Female semiskilled vs. male semiskilled...53.652.548.6 ...54.354.257.8
Female unskilled vs. male unskilled ...43.241.535.9 ...45.044.550.7
Papermaking
Female vs. male unskilled 34.935.733.930.0 39.240.840.546.2
Bookprinting
Female vs. male semiskilled 48.949.748.948.8 50.051.151.855.3
Textiles
Female vs. male skilled 29.129.929.528.5 30.032.633.739.5
Female vs. male unskilled 29.430.829.723.5 31.234.734.736.4
Clothing
Female vs. male semiskilled 43.042.942.538.1 44.345.045.451.0
Boots and shoes
Female vs. male production worker 34.533.833.334.9 33.833.735.044.7
Baking
Female skilled vs. male skilled 42.942.642.638.7 45.845.846.349.4
Female unskilled vs. male unskilled 35.439.335.433.5 38.438.439.850.9
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For hourly earnings a widening of sex differentials predominates in heavy
armament and some other war materials industries, while a narrowing is
observable in several consumers' goods industries.
Industrial Differentials. In the course of a normal cyclical expansion
the output of durable goods tends to rise more rapidly than that of
nondurables. Similarly, producers' goods output tends to gain more than
consumers' goods. This relation is accentuated during rearmament and
war cycles, when producers' goods industries have to satisfy the demand
for weapons, for ammunition, war vehicles, and the like in addition to
supplying essential replacement and investment demands. So, under the
National Socialist regime, the more rapidly expanding industries experi-
enced the most acute labor shortages after they had depleted the pool of
unemployed workers attached to them. Such pressures were conducive to
offers of higher wages, to longer hours, and to a greater relative importance
of premium payments. What we must now seek to determine is whether
and to what extent the differential expansion of industries, or groups of
industries, was in fact reflected in the changing wage structure. As in the
case of other differentials, any conclusions must be based on earnings
data.
Table 61 shows hourly and weekly earnings in producers' as well as
consumers' goods industries with December 1935 as the base. A rather
unexpected feature of this exhibit is that, except for a brief period in 1939,
weekly earnings rose more, relative to December 1935, in consumers'
than in producers' goods industries. A similar situation obtained during
the war in the case of hourly earnings.73
Since information on earnings is available by industry from 1936 on,
we are able to investigate the differences among earnings for various
industries. Actual average hourly and weekly earnings as well as per-
centage changes between the years 1936 and 1939, and March 1944, are
presented in Table 64 for nineteen industries. For hourly earnings, one
would seek in vain for a clear-cut differential development of earnings in
typical war and typical civilian industries. For instance, the metalworking
industries registered a relatively small earnings increase, whereas there was
a large increase in boot and shoe manufacture. We can, however, observe
a rather forceful tendency on the part of hourly earnings in low-wage
industries to increase faster than those in high-wage industries. Weekly
earnings present a different picture: there is little evidence of a systematic
"Germanstatisticians have been puzzled by this behavior and have advanced several
explanations: consumption goods experienced a seasonal low in the base quarter; the
textile industry in the base quarter suffered from raw material shortages and therefore
worked short time in 1935-36; in the producers' goods industries there occurred a
relatively greater dilution of skills; the employment of women changed the composition
of the work force more in producers' than in consumers' goods; after combing con-
sumers' goods industries for dispensable manpower, the remaining workers had to
perform more overtime work at premium rates. The factors cited are probably contri-
butory rather than alternative.250 WAGESIN GERMANY
relation between earnings levels and earnings increases; and, in war
industries, weekly earnings tended to advance faster than in civilian
industries.
These tendencies are reflected in the following dispersion measures




1944 (March) 16.3 22.6
aAsimplified coefficient of variation is used, consisting of the average deviation (signs
ignored) of the industry averages from their own mean, divided by the mean, multiplied
by 100.
For hourly earnings we find that industry averages tended to move
together. The dispersion measures for weekly earnings do not show signifi-
cant changes. This means that the tendency toward more equal hourly
TABLE 64
Average Hourly and Weekly Earnings, Nineteen Industries,
1936, 1939, and March 1944
HOURLYEARNINGS
AMOUNT (pfennigs) PERCENTAGE CHANGE
1936 1939 19441936-391939-441936-44
Industrya
1 Book printing 106.4 107.0 114.2 +.6+6.7 +7.3
2 Brewing 100.9 101.9 101.5 +1.0 —.4 +.6
3 Electrical goodsb 92.3 99.8 107.0 +8.1 +7.2+ 15.9
4 Iron and steel 88.2 96.5 103.6 +9.4+7.4 + 17.5
5 Instrumentsb 87.4 95.2 102.5 +8.9 +7.7 + 17.3
6 Machineryb 87.3 94.7 101.1 +8.5 +6.8+15.8
7 Metalworking 85.7 92.2 96.5 +7.6+4.7+ 12.6
8 Foundries 81.4 92.9 100.0 + 14.1+7.6+22.9
9 Mining 76.1 83.2 92.4 +9.3+11.1+21.4
10 Building 71.6 76.8 82.3 +7.3 +7.2 + 14.9
11 Stone and clay 65.0 75.2 80.3+15.7+6.8+23.5
12 Papermaking 63.6 66.8 73.6 +5.0+10.2+15.7
13 Boots and shoes 63.2 68.5 80.8 +8.4+ 18.0+27.8
14 Glass 61.7 68.2 85.2+10.5+24.9+38.1
15 Pottery 58.0 63.9 71.9 + 10.2+ 12.5+24.0
16 Textiles 54.9 58.0 62.8 +5.6+8.3 + 14.4
17 Clothing 54.6 60.4 66.4+10.6+9.9+21.6
18 Sawmills 54.6 63.6 71.8+16.5+12.9+31.5
19 Baking 50.6 53.3 61.8 +5.3+15.9+22.1
Average 73.9 79.9 87.1 +8.1 +9.0 + 17.9
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TABLE 64, continued
WEEKLYEARNINGS






































6 Instrumentsb 42.89 49.18 52.27 + 14.7 +6.3+21.9
7 Metalworking 42.27 46.24 46.48 +9.4 +.5+10.0
8 Foundries 40.29 47.00 52.05+16.7+10.7+29.2
9 Mining 33.73 39.77 47.46+17.9+19.3+40.7
10 Building 32.97 37.31 38.27+ 13.2 +2.6+ 16.1
11 Papermaking 31.29 34.13 36.91 +9.1 +8.1+ 18.0
12 Stone and clay 30.52 36.49 38.59+ 19.6 +5.8+26.4
13 Glass 30.13 33.16 40.47 + 10.1+22.0+34.3
14 Pottery 27.83 30.51 32.58 +9.6 +6.8+17.1
15 Boots and shoes 27.64 30.55 35.51 + 10.5+ 16.2+28.5
16 Sawmills 26.28 31.06 35.32+18.2+13.7+34.4
17 Clothing 25.36 28.03 26.54+ 10.5 —5.3 +4.7
18 Baking 23.76 24.66 25.01 +3.8 +1.4+5.3
19 Textiles 23.20 26.04 27.17+12.2 +4.3+17.1
Average 35.13 39.42 42.85+12.2 +8.7+22.0
a Rankedby earnings levels, 1936.
bSemiskilledmale workers only.
SOURCE: Handbuch 1928-44, pp. 470-71. Data for 1944 available only for March.
earnings must have been counterbalanced by the greater expansion of
hours in the high-wage war industries.
Comparison with World War I can be carried through only in general
terms, since industry averages for the earlier period are available for only
a limited number of industries and are based on relatively small samples of
companies. Earnings averages for the first war period are available only
in daily form; since they reflect changes in hours, they are more comparable
to the weekly than to the hourly earnings of the second war. The averages
for World War I indicated a marked trend toward industrial inequality.
The National Socialists, with their effective wage controls, obviously were
able to avoid an extreme industrial differentiation of wage incomes.
Irregular and Regular Work Force. Under the National Socialist regime,
and particularly during the war years, the services of supplementary labor
became so important that a brief description of the wages of such workers
seems pertinent to the present discussion. The government mobilized
some of the auxiliary workers at wages sharply differentiated from those
paid to regular workers. This introduced an element of wage differentia-
tion which remained largely unreflected in the official statistics of rates
and earnings.w -
252 WAGESIN GERMANY
In its efforts to mobilize all available labor resources, the government
introduced compulsory service for young men and women, whowere
summoned to serve a year at agricultural work. There were also a number
of so-called "voluntary" services, such as the agricultural year for younger
boys and girls, and the domestic year for girl members of the Nazi youth
organization. During the war, school children were mobilized to help
at harvest time and to perform other essential services—all at nominal
remuneration.
Quantitatively more important than auxiliary labor service in its
various forms was the regular employment of foreign workers. The
following tabulation indicates the increase in their numbers:
October 1940January 1944
(millions)
Civilian Workers 1.1 6.4
War Prisoners 1.1 2.2
Total 2.2 8.6
SOURCE: E. M. Kulischer, "The Displacement of Population in Europe," International
Labour Office, Studies and Reports, Series 0, No. 8 (Montreal, 1943); and "The Mobili-
sation of Foreign Labour by Germany," International Labour Review, Oct. 1944.
In 1944, about every fourth worker in Germany was a foreigner. Among
the foreign civilian workers a sharp distinction must be drawn between
eastern and western workers. The latter, at least theoretically, received
the same basic wages as German workers, while the eastern workers were
paid considerably lower rates.74 Within the group of eastern workers a
further distinction was made between three subgroups. The most favored
subgroup consisted of workers from the Baltic countries. They usually
were given inferior jobs, received no premium pay for night and holiday
work, and paid a special tax of 15 percent on earnings above 9 marks
"in order that their previous standard of living not be exceeded." Con-
siderably worse treatment was accorded to Polish workers; a special
regulation provided that they were to be employed at the lowest existing
rate for each occupation75 and age, and stipulated that the rules on mini-
mum piece rates would not apply to them. The maximum rates for the
Poles were to be 70 percent of the rates received by Germans, and they
were to get no family allowances, birth and marriage subsidies, bonuses
at Christmas or other times. The third group, the Russians, were in the
worst position. Their basic rates were the same as those for German workers,
but in accordance with a special decree concerning the remuneration of
labor from the newly acquired eastern territories,76 all employers of
Russian workers had to deduct a steeply progressive tax which left such
The sole exceptions are the so-called Volksdeutsche (members of the German ethnic
group) who were paid German wages.
It appears that the remuneration of Polish skilled workers was at the rates of
unskilled Germans.
76.Reichsgesetzblatt,Part i, p. 41, January 20, 1942.WAR, INFLATION, AND DICTATORSHIP 253
workersa maximum weekly wage of 17 marks, out of which they had to
pay 1.50 marks a day for board and lodging. The charge for living expenses
could be reduced only if the deductions left a hapless Russian with less
than 40 pfennigs a day.77
In the drive to stimulate output, special premiums were introduced in
August 1943 for efficient Russian workers with satisfactory records of
conduct. They were promised a premium of 20 percent after one year of
loyal service, 30 percent after two years, and 50 percent after three years.
They were not, however, to receive premium pay for overtime, night, or
Sunday work. Here is an approximate comparison of wages for German
and eastern workers, as of April 1943:
UnskilledSkilled
(marks)
German workers' weekly wages 24.50 42.35
Minus eastern workers' tax —5.25 —16.80
Equals gross wage, eastern workers 19.25 25.55
Minus deductions for board and lodging —10.50 —10.50
Amount paid out to eastern workers 8.75 15.05
In addition, some part of the final cash payment was made in scrip
which theoretically could be cashed, but only in occupied Russian terri-
tory.
As for western foreign workers, although their basic rates were the same
as those of German workers, their wages were in fact reduced in several
ways. There were, for instance, compulsory deductions for support of the
workers' dependents in their home country. Furthermore, the resultant
payments to the dependents were made in the currencies of the workers'
countries. Having introduced artificial exchange rates which favored the
German currency, the Third Reich obtained the services of these foreign
workers at still lower cost than appeared on the books.78
Yet to be described are the rates paid to prisoners of war. These were
nominal. In 1944, Russian prisoners received 40 pfennigs per day, Polish
prisoners 70 pfennigs, and prisoners of all other nationalities 90 pfennigs.
If the work consisted of emergency repairs after air raids, the rates paid
the unfavored nationals were still lower, for Russians 30 pfennigs and for
Poles 60 pfennigs, while other nationalities obtained the normal rate of
90 pfennigs. These rates were of course supplementary to the lodging
and food provided in the prisoner-of-war camps. If private employers
used gangs of prisoners they had to pay the fixed wages, provide the
prisoners with board and lodging, and make compensation to their
camps. Since war prisoners must be fed, clothed, and housed whether
Yet this was an improvement over original arrangements. Before September 1943,
reductions in the charge for board and lodging for Russian workers were permitted
only if they retained less than 20 pfennigs a day.
78SeeUmbach, op. cit., p. 513.w
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they worked or not, their impressment at nominal wages constituted an
important net advantage to the German economy.
Finally, let us look at the employment situation of Jewish workers.
From 1933 onward, Jews had been gradually deprived of all opportunities
for work. With the emergency requirements of 1939, there was a slight
reversal of policy, and a small number of physically fit Jews were put to
work. A special decree covering their employment79 specified that they
had to accept any work, were debarred from benefit of protective regu-
lations, were to be paid subsistence wages only, and were preferably to be
assigned to menial tasks in strict separation from other workers. Severe
punishment was threatened if anyone, including employers, violated
these rules.8° The period of legalized employment of Jewish workers was
relatively brief. When the turn of military events drove the regime to ever
more desperate measures, the gain to be derived from the employment of
some Jewish workers was subordinated to a more effective prosecution
of the regime's extermination policies.
WAGES AND PRICES
Wage Rates and Wholesale Prices. Prices were strictly controlled during
the period of National Socialism.81 The effectiveness of such controls can
be gauged by the fact that price levels in all major categories remained
materially below their previous prosperity levels, although from 1939 on
the level of general business activity was higher and the scarcity of goods
more pronounced than in 1928-29 (see Table 65 and Appendix Table A-i).
Even in the course of World War II, wholesale and retail prices did not
increase by much more than 10 percent, compared with the doubling or
trebling of price levels in the course of World War I.
Controls were most effective in two "price" areas—labor and pro-
ducers' goods. As noted previously, wage rates under National Socialism
did not increase more than 3 percent, and prices of producers' goods were,
by the end of World War II, on a par with or slightly below their 1933
position. The stability in these two areas is the more noteworthy since
general wholesale price levels from 1933 to 1944 increased by about a
quarter and prices in some commodity groups went up more than a third.
Thus, the high degree of stability of wage rates was a cyclical abnormality
in relation not only to general business activity but also to the substantial
changes in wholesale price levels.
The special position of producers' goods in these comparisons is not
fortuitous. In the past, cartels had been more effective in the producers'
goods than in the consumers' goods area. The prevention of major
downward adjustmentS during the Great Depression left producers' goods
"October3, 1941, with executive orders of October 31, 1941.
Livchen,"Wartime Developments in German Wage Policy," InternationalLabour
Review, August 1942, p. 163.
Thefirst control measures were issued as early as the fall of 1933. See L. Hamburger,
How Nazi Germany Controlled Business (Brookings Institution, 1943), p. 47.WAR, INFLATION, AND DICTATORSHIP 255
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1928 116 126 145 151 135 116 149 277
1929 122 128 142 149 134 117 146 247
1930 124 123 129 135 127 116 136 194
1931 118 113 115 116 116 111 119 132
1932 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1933 97 98 97 100 96 96 95 114
1934 97 100 102 103 98 96 100 126
1935 97 102 105 103 101 96 106 138
1936 97 103 108 106 103 95 108 149
1937 97 104 110 108 106 96 113 157
1938 97 104 110 106 107 95 115 147
1939 98 105 111 107 107 95 116 149a
1940 98 108 114 111 110 95 121
1941 99 110 116 113 112 96 125
1942 99 113 119 115 113 96 126
100 115 120 115 115 96 129
1944 lOOb 117 122 116 116 96 130
(1939 =100)
1939 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1940 100 103 103 104 103 100 104
1941 101 106 105 106 105 101 108
1942 101 108 107 108 106 101 109
1943 102 110 109 108 107 101 111
1944 102b 112 110 108 108 101 113
aFirstfour months only. bAssumedto equal 1943.
SOURCE:Wagerates, see sources for col. 1, Part m, Appendix Table A-2.Cost of living, Appendix
TableA-33. Wholesale prices, Handbuch 1928-44,p. 460; IKFHandbuch 1936, pp. 99 if; Statisgik
des In- und Auslands,
ina relatively strong price position. This fact, together with the rapid
expansion of production and sales, assured increased profits to manu-
facturers of producers' goods despite the fairly strict control of their sales
prices and the price increases in raw materials• and semimanufactured
items. The price control by cartels during the Great Depression and the
price control by government during National Socialism led to a situation
in which producers' goods prices throughout 1924-45 fluctuated less than
consumers' goods prices or any other major price category.256 WAGES IN GERMANY
The less rigid control of consumers' goods prices was deliberate, and
played a most important role in the economic policies of National
Socialism. It was an intrinsic part of the price and wage control system
designed to allocate national income in keeping with the over-all objectives
of the regime. Controlled increases in prices of consumers' goods at
wholesale formed the basis of similarly controlled increases in consumers'







Cost of Living, by Major Components, 1939—1945
Cost of Living. The official cost-of-living index for the years of National
Socialism shows an increase of about 20 percent compared with a wage-
rate rise of 3 percent, a fact worth emphasis, since in the preceding ex-
pansion the increase in wage rates had tended to outpace the rise in cost-
of-living. It is probable, however, that also in some pre-1913 reference
expansions as well as during World War I there was a rise of living costs
in excess of that in wage rates.82 Characteristically, the greater increase of
living costs as compared with wage rates can be found throughout the
period of National Socialism.
Examination of the index reveals that the increases are concentrated
in a few of its segments (see Appendix A-33 and Chart 31). Through the
years 1933-45, the rent index remained entirely stable, the miscellaneous
index rose by less than 10 percent, and the fuel and light index actually
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Source: Appendix Table A-33 (base shifted).w
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droppedby a few percent. Substantial increases were registered only in the
food segment (up about 30 percent) and in the clothing segment (up
about 80 percent). These two segments, however, account for two-thirds
of the total index, and could thus impart considerable fluctuation to the
index as a whole.83
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Source: Table 66.
Foodprices are responsible for most of the seasonality of the total
index. Table 66 and Chart 32 present some selected food prices. We note
that meat and bakery products were kept at a virtually stable level from
the beginning of the war. Prices of milk products were raised in April of
1940 but were rigidly controlled thereafter. Prices for vegetables and
potatoes fluctuated seasonally within their historical range; the trend
level of these prices was permitted to move upward gradually. With this
83Thecomposition of the index is based on an inquiiy into consumption habits
undertaken in 1927-28. The segments of the index and their relative weights are as
follows: food, 55.4 percent; rent, 13.1 percent; fuel and light, 4.7 percent; clothing,
12.9 percent; miscellaneous (including furniture), 13.9 percent.w -
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TABLE 66





Aug. 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sept. 100.0 62.4 85.9 100.1 100.0 97.6
Oct. 99.4 58.7 79.9 100.1 100.1 97.6
Nov. 99.3 58.7 82.1 100.1 100.1 97.9
Dec. 98.8 59.7 87.2 100.1 100.1 98.3
1940
Jan. 98.4 61.9 102.5 100.3 100.2 98.9
Feb. 98.4 62.9 114.4 100.3 100.4 99.0
Mar. 98.5 65.1 125.6 100.4 106.0 101.0
Apr. 98.5 65.6 133.6 100.3 109.3 102.1
May 98.5 66.9 168.6 100.3 109.4 103.3
June 98.5 68.9 178.7 100.3 109.6 103.4
July 98.5 87.2 165.9 100.4 109.6 104.7
Aug. 98.4 100.2 118.2 100.4 110.0 106.6
Sept. 98.4 71.0 101.4 100.4 110.1 104.0
Oct. 98.4 59.5 94.8 100.4 110.1 101.5
Nov. 98.5 59.5 92.8 100.4 110.3 101.0
Dec. 98.6 60.8 98.7 100.3 110.3 101.5
1941
Jan. 98.8 61.9 104.3 100.5 110.3 101.8
Feb. 98.9 63.4 116.8 100.5 110.3 102.1
Mar. 98.9 65.6 123.5 100.5 110.4 102.5
Apr. 98.5 65.9 129.1 100.5 110.5 103.0
May 98.3 67.3 137.2 100.5 110.5 103.9
June 98.4 68.9 156.0 100.7 110.5 104.6
July 98.5 99.0 164.1 100.5 110.5 107.5
Aug. 98.5 110.3 110.8 100.5 106.6
Sept. 98.5 82.5 90.6 100.5 110.5 102.8
Oct. 98.5 60.2 87.5 100.7 110.5 101.0
Nov. 98.1 60.2 85.7 100.7 110.5 101.1
Dec. 98.0 61.9 90.8 100.8 110.7 101.1
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TABLE66, continued
Food Costs, by Months, 1939-1943
(August 1939 =100)
Year andBakery Meats andMilkand
MonthProductsPotatoesVegetables Fish ProductsAll
1942
Jan. 98.0 62.4 103.8 100.9 110.7 101.7
Feb. 98.0 63.8 118.6 100.9 110.8 104.1
Mar. 98.0 65.6 128.7 100.9 110.8 105.0
Apr. 98.0 66.0 142.1 100.9 110.8 105.6
May 98.0 67.3 163.0 100.9 110.8 106.9
June 98.0 69.7 173.8 100.9 110.8 109.0
July 98.0 106.1 177.4 100.9 110.8 111.2
Aug. 98.0 116.1 131.2 100.9 110.7 109.3
Sept. 98.1 78.8 98.7 100.9 110.8 103.2
Oct. 98.2 74.3 95.1 100.9 110.9 102.7
Nov. 98.4 74.5 95.5 101.1 110.8 103.0
Dec. 98.3 76.7 99.6 100.9 110.8 103.6
1943
Jan. 98.4 79.4 111.2 101.1 110.9 105.1
Feb. 98.4 79.9 122.4 101.3 111.2 105.9
Mar. 98.3 81.3 128.0 101.3 111.2 106.2
Apr. 98.4 81.8 139.9 101.3 111.0 106.8
May 98.0 83.8 174.9 101.3 111.0 107.5
June 98.0 87.2 159.6 101.3 110.9 108.9
July 98.1 121.4 161.5 101.3 111.0 111.9
Aug. 98.0 126.8 125.3 101.3 110.9 111.7
Sept. 98.0 78.0 106.3 101.3 111.1 106.3
Oct. 98.0 75.1 102.2 101.7 111.1 105.7
Nov. 98.0 76.1 101.8 101.7 110.9 106.5
Dec. 98.0 77.4 104.0 101.6 110.8 107.0
1944
Jan. 98.0 79.9 113.4 101.7 110.9 108.0
Feb. 98.0 80.0 119.0 101.7 110.8 108.4
Mar. 98.0 81.9 127.6 101.7 110.9 109.0
Apr. 98.0 81.9 142.8 101.7 110.9 110.7
May 98.0 83.3 153.6 101.7 110.9 110.2
June 98.0 87.0 164.1 101.7 110.8 111.7
July 98.0 130.4 181.2 101.7 110.8 117.0
Aug. 98.0 121.0 145.1 101.7 110.8 114.9
Sept. 98.0 83.5 111.2 101.7 110.8 110.1
aTotalfood group of cost-of-living index for 72 cities.
SOURCE:Wirtschaftund Statistik, passim. Base shifted to August 1939 =100.260 WAGESIN GERMANY
highly individualized system of controlling small groups or even separate
items, food prices and living costs in general could be forced into con-
formity with the basic economic policies of the regime.
The above observations concern the actual behavior of the cost-of-
living index, as published. For the purposes of the present inquiry it is
necessary to comment on the quality of the index. lEn 1933 the published
cost-of-living index was based on an obsolete consumption scheme which
had originated in 1907 and had been modified only slightly to allow for
obvious changes in consumption up to the mid-1920's. The inadequacies
of the index were generally recognized and led to an official budget
inquiry in 1927-28. Preparation of a new cost-of-living index, based on
the results of the more recent inquiry, was started during the time of the
Weimar Republic, but actual revision and publication of the new index
were undertaken only in 1934. Despite the major increases in the number
of commodities included and the changes in the weights of the commodity
groups, the unrevised and revised measure agreed surprisingly well—at
least in the behavior of the aggregate index.84 The revision did not
entirely silence criticism of the cost-of-living index. The average income
of the sample used in the budget inquiry was said to deviate substantially
from that of the working class as a whole; the preponderance of large
families in the sample was said to lead to a disproportionately low share
of rental expenses; and the expenditures for tobacco and alcoholic
beverages were held to be seriously underestimated.85 However it was
conceded by some critics that, up to about 1936, the new index might have
been a tolerably faithful indicator of changes in the living costs of German
workers.
The Nazi trend toward autarchy, the reservation of major consumption
items for military purposes, and the widespread use of substitutes changed
consumption patterns and impaired the value of the fixed-weight index.
It was hinted, even by National Socialist officials, that the index might not
mirror satisfactorily the actual increases in expenditures necessary to
maintain a given level of economic well-being. In fact some rough esti-
mates of the bias were made. Between 1933 and 1937 actual living costs
were said to have risen by 7 to 15 percent instead of the 6 percent indicated
by the official index. 86
The new index is presented and discussed in "Neuberechnung der Reichsindex-
ziffer für die Lebenshaltungskosten," Wirtschafl und Statistik, 1934, pp. 626-31. A
discussion of the principles imderlying the revision can be found in "Die Messung der
Lebenshaltungskosten," Vierte!jahrshefte zur Statistik des Deutschen Reichs, 1937,
i, pp. 149-165. The results of the budget inquiry of 1927-28, basic to the revision, are
contained in "Die Lebenshaltung von 2,000 Arbeiter-, Angesteilten- und Beamten-
haushaltungen," zur Statistik des Deutschen Reichs (No. 22, Berlin, 1932).
W. Woytinsky, "Statistik der Arbeit," in Internationales Handwörterbuch des
Gewerkschaftswesens(Berlin,1932), pp. 1585-1586.
86SeeDie Wirtschafiskurve, August 1938, pp. 301 if. Jurgen Kuczynski makes some
adjustments of the official index which imply a rise of at least 9 percent between 1933
and 1937 (his explicit adjustments are for the increase from 1932 to 1937). See his
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Thereal difficulties started in 1939, when the war accentuated the
changes in consumption patterns caused by more acute shortages and
by the introduction of rationing. The Statistische Reichsamt revised the
character of the index to make allowance for its changing composition.87
The new one is a chain index based on monthly link relatives which
describe, as well as possible, price changes of identical goods. This was
not always feasible, however. Where there were substitutions of rations,
the price of the substitute could be inserted without the use of links.
We find that "fat consumption was cheapened because more margarine
was allotted instead of other edible fats,"88 or in the case of vegetables, the
prices for the three vegetables in most ample supply at any time were used
for the computation of the index.89 By such treatment the value of the
index as an indicator of price changes is certainly impaired. Furthermore,
the more permanent substitutions of goods in the index were made
without proper regard to quality. Fats, for instance, could be replaced by
jams and jellies. It is clear that, with such substitutions, the quality of the
priced consumers' goods could deteriorate without any fixed lower limit.
Eventually a diet of turnips and ersatz-coffee might be priced instead of a
high protein diet. And while the prices of the original consumption might
have skyrocketed, the index may show moderate increases only. The
authorities recognized that, as the war proceeded, the cost-of-living index
was regarded with extreme skepticism by those members of the public
who cared to follow it. But the authorities insisted staunchly that basic
foods did not cost much more in 1942 than they had in 1938, and added:
"If this result seems to be contradicted by the experience of daily life,
this is due to attempts on the part of consumers to supplement their
nutrition (beyond the basic needs covered by rationed foods) by buying
unrationed food and luxuries (e.g., restaurant fare) or buying more
expensive qualities than in peacetime."9°
In view of the actual shortages, the widespread network of black
markets, the deteriorations in quality, the changes in consumption patterns,
and the leeway granted to the compilers, the cost-of-living index for the
period of World War II must be regarded as an unreliable measure. One
is safe, however, in assuming that the official measure did not overstate
the rise of living costs.
REAL WAGES
Wage Rates. The policy of stabilizing wage rates but permitting rises
in living costs led to a gradual decline in real hourly wage rates of roughly
Fora description of the major changes see Wirrschaft und Statistik, November
1939, p. 717; and October 1942, p. 343.
88ibid.,October 1942, p. 347.
89ibid.,May 1942, p. 141; June 1943, P. 166.
9°WirtschaftundStatist/k,quoted by H. W. Singer, London and Cambridge Economic
Service,January1943, p. 22.262 WAGESIN GERMANY
13 percent between 1932 and 1943 (see Table 67).°' The significance of
this decline has been commented upon previously. Briefly, the drop in
real hourly rates was expected to serve as a spur to production and at the
same time to limit consumers' demand on the national product. The close
control over wages and prices permitted a gradual decline of real wage
rates, timed to correspond with increases in hours. The decrease in real
wage rates was concentrated during World War II. Whereas the decline
from 1932 to 1939 amounted to only 6 percent, it was about 9 percent from
1939 to 1944.
TABLE67
AverageReal Wage Rates and Earnings, All Industry, 1932-1944
(1932 =100)





















































a Assumesstability of money rates, 1943 to 1944.
Money wages, see sources to Appendix Table A-2. Cost of living, Appendix
Table A-33, base shifted to 1932 =100.
Decreases of real wage rates occurred during both world wars, though
the situations differed in several respects. First, the real rate decline during
World War I started from cyclical peak levels (1913), that during World
War II from trough levels (1932). Second, wage rates, cost of living, and
therefore real wage changes were uncontrolled during the first war but
controlled during the second. Finally, in contrast to wage behavior during
World War I, the deterioration of real wage rates during the more recent
conflict was uniform, and avoided extreme differences between favored
and unfavored groups of workers. The differences in wage behavior as
91Inview of theminimum character of money wage rates during the Weimar Republic,
it should be noted that the National Socialist regime minimum rates and effectively
paid rates were rather close. This was brought about by fixing wages at depression
levels. Real wage rates, as described above, are based on the official cost-of-living index.
If the adjusted cost-of-living index given in column 5 of Table 68 is used as a deflator,
the total decline between the years mentioned would amount to 17 percent.-
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betweenthe two wars can be observed from Table 52 and 67.92Realwage
rates during World War II, as derived from official wage and living-cost
data, declined uniformly by about 7 to 9 percent. The few rate series
available for World War I illustrate the larger decline as well as the wider
differences in the development of real rates. Between 1913 and 1918 the
decline ranged from 0.2 percent (unskilled railway workers) to 46 percent
(printers and compositors). The relative position of the reported series
in 1917 is even worse than in 1918, bearing witness to the extreme fluctua-
tions of real wages during the first war.
Earnings. Real rates and real earnings under National Socialism can be
ccmpared in Table 67. While real rates decreased throughout the Nazi
period, average hourly real earnings at first maintained their level (1932-
36), then rose gradually by a little more than 8 percent (1936-41), decreased
by about 1 percent (to 1943), and then by another 2 percent (to
This behavior is closely related to the economic and political fortunes of
the regime. During the early period when the creation of jobs was the
major objective (1932-36), rises in earnings just about compensated for
increased living costs. During the period of active war preparation and the
initial war expansion (1936-41), there were material increases of hourly
real earnings. The period of all-out war and military reversals brought
about the reduction of hourly real earnings.
If official real wage measures are used as a guide, hourly real earnings
were significantly (mere than 5 percent) above depression levels only in
five out of the almost thirteen years of National Socialism. And if some
account is taken of the admitted defects of the official cost-of-living index,
the number of "favorable" years would be further reduced.
Weekly real earnings increased considerably more than hourly real
earnings, corresponding to the relation of weekly and hourly money
earnings. According to official data, weekly real earnings increased by
31 percent from 1932 to 1941. They dropped in subsequent years, but in
1944 were still 24 percent above depression levels and even 6 percent above
1929 levels. The record appears less impressive if adjustments are made
for increased deductions and for the inadequacies of the cost-of-living
index—at least to the extent admitted by contemporary German publica-
tions. Comparisons of unadjusted and adjusted weekly real earnings levels
in 1929 and from 1932 to 1944 are presented in Table 68. The table shows
that after these adjustments weekly real earnings at their peak in 1941 were
only 21 percent above depression levels and in 1944 only 14 percent above,
compared with the 1929 position of 18 percent above 1932. But even after
92Seealso Table 79 and Chart 33.
These comparisons are rough. Adjustment for price changes during World War I
was carried out on the basis of rather crude estimates of living costs, but during World
War IL on the basis of the official index described in the previous section.
"The downward bias of living costs, as previously discussed, probably led to an
overstatement of the rise in real earnings after 1936 and to an understatement of their
eventual decline.264 WAGESIN GERMANY
TABLE 68
Weekly Real Earnings, Adjusted, 1929 and 1932-1944
(1932 =100)
WEEKLY REAL EARNINGS COST-OF-LiVING INDEXES
After Deductions











1929 117 118 118 127.7 127.7
1932 100 100 100 100.0 100.0
1933 105 104 104 97.8 97.8
1934 110 109 109 100.4 100.4
1935 111 110 110 102.0 102.0
1936 114 112 112 103.2 103.2
1937 117 115 110 103.7 108.6
1938 121 119 114 104.1 109.0
1939 126 123 118 104.6 109.5
1940 126 122 116 107.9 113.0
1941 131 127 121 110.4 115.6
1942 128 124 119 113.3 118.6
1943 128 123 118 114.8 120.2
1944 124 119 114 117.2 122.7
SOURCE, by column:
(1)Appendix Table A-2, adjusted by col. 4 Ofthis table.
(2) Table 16, col. 6, adjusted by ccl. 4 of this table.
(3) Table 16, col. 6, adjusted by ccl. 5 of this table.
(4) Appendix Table A-33.
(5) Official cost-of-living index used for 1929 and 1932-36. For 1937, assumed to be
11 percent over 1933 on the basis of estimate in Die Wirtschaftskurve which states
the rise in living costs between 1933 and 1937 to be 7 to 15 percent (Vol. 17, pp. 301 if.).
For 1938-44, revised by ratio of adjusted to official index in 1937. This adjustment
assumes no increase in the bias ratio—a conservative assumption. See Hilde Oppen-
heimer-Bluhm, The Standard of Living of German Labor under Nazi Rule, Supplement v,
Social Research, 1943,p.39.
these adjustments the real earnings data are of limited significance. Whether
qualities were kept up or deteriorated, whether workers had relatives on
farms, whether they were friends with the butcher, whether they had access
to the black market, whether they obtained gifts from soldiers, whether
their places of employment provided one square meal—these factors more
than others determined the workers' economic well-being and the amount
of goods they could purchase with their wages. It is such considerations
that led some authors to believe that for the war years real wages should
not be computed at all.95 Without prejudice to the limited use made of
°5Foran eloquent defenseof this view see Jurgen Kuczynski, Germany under Fascism,
1933 to the Present Day, pp. 175-76. Kuczynski, though continuing to report money
wages and cost-of-living data, stops computing real wages with 193&,WAR, INFLATION, AND DICTATORSHIP 265
thereal wage measure in the preceding pages, it can be readily agreed
that, in the course of the war, real wages—however measured—became
a less and less important indicator of economic well-being. The reduced
rations, the scarcities, the deterioration of goods in general, the increase
in hours and intensity of work, the tightening restrictions on mobility,
the cutting of holidays and vacations, and the exhaustion induced by air
raids and air-raid alarms—none of these factors is reflected in real wage
measures.
During World War IIreal wages deteriorated more tardily and
probably less than during World War I. This was because of exploitation
of occupied territories, more systematic use of domestic and foreign
labor reserves, productivity increases since the previous war, and the
system of control measures. These factors permitted the provision of a
substantial amount of consumers' goods despite the devotion of all major
resources to actual war purposes. Thus weekly real earnings as measured
by the official index began to sink only in 1941. The food situation did not
become really serious until 1944, when bombing raids disorganized normal
household routine to such an extent that more than twenty-six million
people could be fed only in communal centers. Things went from bad to
worse, until the final defeat. In fact, it was only years after the termination
of hostilities that real wages and consumption began to recover.